Drennan v. State, 315 Kan. 228

In 2003 Thomas J. Drennan Jr. was convicted of first-degree murder and given a hard-50 life sentence; his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.
Drennan filed multiple collateral challenges: two prior K.S.A. 60-1507 motions (ineffective assistance) were denied before he filed a pro se third 60-1507 and a K.S.A. 22-3504 motion claiming his hard-50 sentence was unconstitutional and therefore illegal.
The district court denied both the third 60-1507 (as untimely and successive) and the 22-3504 motion; Drennan appealed.
Drennan argued his sentence was unconstitutional under Apprendi and therefore unlawful under K.S.A. 21-6628(c), or alternatively that Alleyne merely extended Apprendi making his sentence invalid when pronounced.
The Kansas Supreme Court held the third 60-1507 was untimely/successive and rejected Drennan’s retroactivity/Apprendi arguments, concluding Alleyne was a substantive change in law and not retroactive.
The court further held K.S.A. 21-6628(c) and K.S.A. 22-3504 do not permit correction of a sentence that was lawful when pronounced but later invalidated by Alleyne, so the 22-3504 claim was denied.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timeliness/successive nature of third K.S.A. 60-1507 motion	Drennan: third motion timely because filed while second was pending; Alleyne/manifest injustice excuse applies	State: motion filed >1 year after direct appeal and is successive; exceptions don't apply	Denied — motion untimely and successive; Alleyne does not excuse successive 60-1507s
Whether Alleyne is merely an extension of Apprendi making the sentence unconstitutional when pronounced	Drennan: Alleyne only extended Apprendi, so his sentence was unconstitutional under Apprendi at sentencing	State: Alleyne overruled Harris and changed the law; it is not merely an extension and is prospective only	Denied — Alleyne was a substantive change, not retroactive; sentence was lawful when pronounced
Whether K.S.A. 21-6628(c) or K.S.A. 22-3504 require relief because the sentence now conflicts with Alleyne	Drennan: statute requires modification if sentencing procedure later found unconstitutional	State: provision applies only when term or authorizing statute is unconstitutional; hard-50 was lawful under prior law	Denied — statutory provision inapplicable; sentence not an "illegal sentence" as defined at sentencing
Construction of pro se filing as 22-3504 vs 60-1507	Drennan: pro se filings should be construed by substance as a 22-3504 (timely)	State: Drennan also filed a separate 22-3504; construction is moot	Moot as to reclassification; court addressed 22-3504 on merits and denied relief

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000) (any fact other than prior conviction that increases statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury)
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (U.S. 2013) (facts that increase mandatory minimum must be found by a jury; overruled Harris)
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (U.S. 2002) (upheld judicial fact-finding for mandatory minimums prior to being overruled by Alleyne)
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (U.S. 2002) (judicial fact-finding in capital sentencing unconstitutional)
State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102 (Kan. 2014) (applied Alleyne to Kansas hard-sentencing statutes prospectively)
State v. Coleman, 312 Kan. 114 (Kan. 2021) (K.S.A. 21-6628(c) is a fail-safe that applies only when the term or authorizing statute is found unconstitutional)
Kirtdoll v. State, 306 Kan. 335 (Kan. 2017) (Alleyne is prospective; its change cannot justify successive 60-1507 relief)
State v. Appleby, 313 Kan. 352 (Kan. 2021) (reaffirmed that Alleyne's change cannot excuse untimely/successive collateral attacks)
State v. Murdock, 309 Kan. 585 (Kan. 2019) (an illegal sentence is assessed at the time it is pronounced)