Drake Interiors, L.L.C. v. Andrea Marie Thomas & Robert Warren Thomas
2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 5722
| Tex. App. | 2014Background
- Drake Interiors obtained a 2004 judgment (and later an abstract recorded Jan. 18, 2008) against Eastern Bloc and Rob Thomas (not Andrea) for unpaid building materials; the judgment arose from conduct predating Rob’s 2002 marriage to Andrea.
- Rob and Andrea married in 2002, purchased the Asbury townhome in 2003 as joint‑management community property, and later acquired the Queenswood lot in Andrea’s name.
- Drake recorded an abstract of judgment in Harris County in January 2008 and filed lis pendens on both properties; Rob and Andrea separated soon after and vacated the Asbury property by August 2008, leasing it to a third party.
- The couple divorced Dec. 31, 2008; Andrea received both properties in the divorce (designating Queenswood homestead Jan. 1, 2009; later designated Asbury homestead Jan. 1, 2011).
- Drake sued for declaratory relief (2009), seeking judgment that its abstract created a lien on the Asbury property; Andrea moved for partial summary judgment asserting the lien was invalid; the trial court granted Andrea’s motion and denied Drake’s; the court also awarded Andrea attorney’s fees.
- The court of appeals reversed in part: it held that community property may be reached for a spouse’s premarital nontortious debts if the lien attached during marriage, but remanded because the record lacked conclusive proof whether the Asbury property was exempt (homestead) when the abstract was first recorded or whether abandonment occurred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Drake) | Defendant's Argument (Andrea) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an abstract of judgment against Rob alone created a lien on the Asbury property (joint‑management community property) | The abstract was properly recorded and, if it attached during the marriage, it reached the joint community interest despite Andrea not being a party. | The debt was Rob’s premarital debt and Andrea wasn’t a party to the underlying suit, so the lien cannot reach her community interest. | The Family Code allows creditors to reach joint‑management community property for a spouse’s premarital nontortious debts; Andrea’s nonjoinder does not invalidate a lien that attached during marriage. |
| Whether the Asbury property was homestead/exempt at the time the abstract was recorded (so lien could not attach) | The couple intended to move to Queenswood and later vacated Asbury; thus no homestead protection when abstract recorded or by Aug. 1, 2008. | The Asbury property remained homestead and homestead is strongly protected; temporary renting or change of residence does not show abandonment. | There was insufficient evidence to prove abandonment or loss of homestead as a matter of law; summary judgment for Drake was not warranted and the issue must be resolved on remand. |
| Whether the statute of frauds prevents enforcing the judgment lien against Andrea’s property | The lien is an execution device against community property and does not require Andrea’s written promise. | No signed writing from Andrea shows her personal obligation; statute of frauds bars enforcement against her. | The statute of frauds does not bar reaching joint‑management community property under Fam. Code §3.202(c); Andrea is not being held personally liable. |
| Whether res judicata or virtual‑representation doctrines bar Drake from enforcing the judgment against Andrea’s community interest | The judgment is valid and its lien reaches joint community property; res judicata does not limit the lien’s effect on community assets. | Because Andrea was not a party to the prior suit, the judgment cannot bind her interests. | Precedent and the Family Code (as construed in Carlton) permit reaching joint management community property for a spouse’s liability even if the other spouse was not sued; Cooper/abolition of virtual representation does not defeat that result. |
Key Cases Cited
- Carlton v. Estate of Estes, 664 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1983) (predecessor Family Code provision allowing creditors to reach joint‑management community property for one spouse’s liabilities)
- Inwood N. Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1987) (homestead generally exempt from claims of creditors)
- Laster v. First Huntsville Props. Co., 826 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1991) (lienholder’s interest no greater than judgment debtor’s interest once homestead protection ends)
- Stewart Title Co. v. Huddleston, 598 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1980), writ ref’d n.r.e. per curiam, 608 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. 1980) (discussed and distinguished regarding joinder and post‑divorce tenancy interests)
- Gouhenant v. Cockrell, 20 Tex. 96 (Tex. 1857) (historic standard: abandonment of homestead requires clear, unequivocal proof)