Dr. George F. Moricz v. Pamela K. Long and Stacy A. Long, Individually and as Husband and Wife, and Nichole Hamilton, 06-17-00011-CV

Pamela Long formerly worked in Dr. George Moricz’s medical practice; Moricz alleged Long stole supplements and arranged discounted/free care and says she agreed to repay $8,730.45; Long disputes wrongdoing and contends she resigned.
Moricz sent two mailed demand letters and had a process server leave a third letter at Long’s doorstep accusing Long (and warning Stacy Long and Nichole Hamilton) of theft and warning of imminent legal/criminal proceedings.
Moricz filed police reports alleging theft; the police closed the matter as civil ("unfounded").
Long, Stacy, and Nichole sued Moricz for libel per se (based on the demand letters) and Long also sued for invasion of privacy (intrusion) based on the doorstep/delivery.
Moricz moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (anti-SLAPP). The trial court dismissed Long’s claim as to the police report, denied dismissal as to claims arising from the demand letters, and awarded attorney’s fees to Moricz. Both sides appealed; plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Appellate jurisdiction over cross-appeal of Act dismissal	Plaintiffs sought review of portions of the dismissal	No statutory authority permits interlocutory appeal from orders granting dismissal under the Act	Cross-appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
Whether demand letters are protected petitioning activity under the Act	Plaintiffs: letters are not protected pre-suit statements	Moricz: letters were pre-suit demand/notice and thus petitioning activity	Demand letters are protected as exercise of right to petition under §27.001(4)(E); Act applies
Long’s invasion-of-privacy (intrusion) claim	Long: leaving letter on doorstep and mailing letters intruded on her seclusion and was highly offensive	Moricz: mail and doorstep delivery not a highly offensive intrusion	Long failed to show prima facie intrusion/offensiveness; invasion claim dismissed
Libel per se claims based on demand letters	Plaintiffs: letters defamatory as to each recipient	Moricz: plaintiffs cannot show publication of false written statements about Stacy/Nichole to third parties; generally privileged/ protected	Long proved prima facie libel per se (letters accused her of crimes); Stacy and Nichole failed to show clear evidence of publication to third parties and their libel claims were dismissed

In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015) (clarifies nonmovant must present clear and specific evidence to establish prima facie case under the Act)
Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. Crazy Hotel Assisted Living, Ltd., 416 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013) (prima facie under the Act requires minimal factual showing)
Cashion v. Long Canyon Phase II & III Homeowners Ass’n, 517 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017) (pre-suit demand letters can fall within Act’s petitioning protection under subsection (E))
Levatino v. Apple Tree Café Touring, Inc., 486 S.W.3d 724 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016) (discusses limits of petitioning definition when litigation is not pending)
Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973) (recognizes common-law right to privacy)
Leyendecker & Assocs. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. 1984) (false statement accusing a person of a crime is libelous per se)
Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59 (Tex. 2013) (defamation elements and classifications)