Dr. David S. Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc.
905 F.3d 1200
| 11th Cir. | 2018Background
- Dr. David Muransky sued Godiva alleging a willful FACTA violation after a receipt printed the first six and last four digits of his credit card; he sought class-wide statutory damages and fees.
- Parties settled for a $6.3 million fund (no reversion); class counsel sought one-third ($2.1M) in fees and up to $10,000 incentive for the named plaintiff; notice was sent to ~318,000 members; ~47,000 claims submitted; 15 opt-outs; five objectors including Price and Isaacson.
- Objectors argued inadequate notice of the fee motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h), that a lodestar should apply, that the 33% fee and $10,000 incentive were excessive, and (Isaacson) challenged Muransky’s Article III standing.
- The district court preliminarily certified the Rule 23(b)(3) class, approved notice, later granted final approval, awarded $2.1M in fees and $10,000 incentive; objectors appealed.
- Eleventh Circuit considered (1) whether objectors may appeal; (2) Article III standing under Spokeo; (3) adequacy of fee-notice under Rule 23(h); (4) reasonableness of fee and incentive awards.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Muransky) | Defendant's Argument (Godiva/Objectors) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are objecting non‑opt‑out class members parties for purposes of appeal? | Objectors should be allowed to appeal settlement approval because they timely objected. | — | Objectors who timely object and remain in the class are "parties" and may appeal (Devlin applied). |
| Does Muransky have Article III standing for a FACTA claim after Spokeo? | FACTA creates a private right protecting card data; willful disclosure of untruncated card numbers is akin to breach of confidence/bailment and causes concrete injury (plus time/effort to safeguard receipt). | Objector contends mere procedural violation and speculative risk does not confer concrete injury. | Muransky has standing: statutory violation resembles common-law harms and receipt possession imposed a concrete, albeit small, injury. |
| Was class notice adequate under Rule 23(h) regarding the attorney‑fee motion timing? | Initial notice disclosed fee cap; counsel filed fee motion after objection deadline but objectors nonetheless were able to file detailed objections. | Objectors say filing fee motion after the objection deadline violated Rule 23(h) because class members lacked a chance to object to the filed motion. | The timing violated Rule 23(h) (per Mercury reasoning) but error was harmless here because objectors fully presented arguments and no prejudice was shown. |
| Was the 33% common‑fund fee and $10,000 incentive award reasonable? | Fee is reasonable under common‑fund percent‑of‑recovery approach; incentive justified by service and risks. | Objectors argue district should have used lodestar (Perdue) or stuck to 25% benchmark; incentive is excessive given limited representative effort. | District court did not abuse discretion: Camden I governs common‑fund fees (percent method), Johnson factors justified above‑benchmark fee; incentive award supported by record and Holmes scrutiny satisfied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (standards for concrete injury in Article III standing analysis)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires injury in fact, causation, redressability)
- Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002) (nonnamed class members who object at fairness hearing may appeal settlement approval)
- Camden I Condo. Assoc. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768 (11th Cir. 1991) (common‑fund attorney's fees are properly awarded as a reasonable percentage of the fund; 25% benchmark)
- Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (2010) (lodestar enhancements under fee‑shifting statutes require rare/exceptional circumstances)
- Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007) (definition of willfulness under FCRA/FACTA context)
- Mercury Interactive Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 618 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2010) (Rule 23(h) requires class members reasonable opportunity to object after the full fee motion is filed)
- Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144 (11th Cir. 1983) (preferential payments to named plaintiffs require careful scrutiny to ensure fairness)