914 F. Supp. 2d 325
E.D.N.Y2012Background
- Plaintiff Doreen Del Monaco Doyle was a customer service representative for United Airlines from 1985 to 2008.
- In 2005 she was diagnosed with a brain tumor, underwent surgery, and took extended medical leave under the employer's policy (up to three years).
- In February 2008 Doyle sought light-duty or reduced schedule accommodations upon returning; supervisor denied light-duty options.
- Defendant stated Doyle must return to her former position or resign if she did not return within the extended leave period.
- April 2008 separation letter deemed Doyle to have resigned for failure to return after three years of medical leave.
- Plaintiff later learned of a policy allowing light-duty accommodation after extended medical leave and asserted Union involvement issues in connection with her claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of Rehabilitation Act claim and tolling | Doyle seeks six-year contract-based tolling; Act lacks a statute of limitations. | Act §504 claims follow state personal injury limits (three years); no tolling unless extraordinary. | Rehabilitation Act claim time-barred under three-year limit; equitable tolling not established. |
| Equitable tolling applicability | Union misrepresentation constitutes extraordinary circumstances justifying tolling. | Even if true, due diligence requirement not satisfied; delay was about a year. | Equitable tolling not applicable to defeat dismissal. |
| Preemption of breach of contract claim under LMRA §301 | Breach claim independent of CBA; preemption should not apply; union representations excuse not exhausting procedures. | Breach claim is intertwined with CBA; LMRA §301 preempts state-law contract claim. | Breach of contract claim preempted by LMRA §301. |
| Timeliness of hybrid LMRA §301 claim | Hybrid claim viable due to union's misrepresentation obstructing exhaustion. | Hybrid claim time-barred; six-month limit; delay from 2008 to 2011 insufficient to toll. | Hybrid LMRA §301 claim untimely and dismissed with prejudice. |
Key Cases Cited
- Morse v. Univ. of Vermont, 973 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1992) (§504 actions governed by state personal-injury limitations (three years))
- Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2009) (applies three-year New York personal injury limitations to §504 actions)
- Bates v. L.I.R.R., 997 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1993) (cited for LMRA preemption principles)
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (LMRA §301 preemption and need to treat certain claims as §301 claims or dismiss)
- Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994) (preemption analysis under LMRA §301; interaction with collective bargaining agreements)
- DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) (hybrid LMRA §301 claims require sixth-month limitations; exhaustion rules)
- White Rose Food, a Div. of DiGiorgio Corp. v. White Rose Food, 128 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1997) (hybrid LMRA §301 claim requires both employer breach and union breach of duty of fair representation)
- Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (duty of fair representation in handling grievances; bridge to hybrid action)
- Globe Seaways, Inc. v. Nat'l Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Ass’n, 451 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971) (illustrates exhaustion/orthodox approach to union remedies)
- Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Indus. Union of Port Ivory, 312 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1962) (early analysis of contract rights in union context)