Downham v. Arbuckle, 502 P.3d 312

Tenant Tara Downham rented a house from landlord Alan Arbuckle; a wooden pallet used as a makeshift back step sat outside a sliding glass door.
Downham and others used that step for ~18 months; she repeatedly complained it was wobbly, unsafe, and sometimes slid or squeaked. Arbuckle at one point said it needed replacement.
In June 2015 the pallet-step broke when Downham stepped on it and she was injured. Downham sued for negligence (premises liability).
Arbuckle moved for summary judgment invoking the open-and-obvious danger rule; the district court granted summary judgment for Arbuckle.
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals agreed the step was open and obvious as a matter of law but held the open-and-obvious inquiry does not end the duty analysis when the possessor should have anticipated the invitee would nonetheless encounter the hazard. The court reversed summary judgment and remanded for jury determination.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Downham)	Defendant's Argument (Arbuckle)	Held
Was the wooden pallet-step an open and obvious danger?	Downham: danger of breaking was not necessarily obvious from prior complaints about slipping.	Arbuckle: step was visibly makeshift and previously complained about—open and obvious.	Held: Yes — no reasonable jury could find it was not open and obvious.
Does an open-and-obvious danger automatically bar liability, or must the possessor have foreseen invitee encounter?	Downham: Arbuckle knew tenants used that door/step and had complained, so he should have anticipated she’d use it and be harmed.	Arbuckle: Downham had reasonable alternatives (other door, go around house, move step); therefore he should not be liable.	Held: Open-and-obviousness is not dispositive; whether Arbuckle should have anticipated use and harm is a jury question — summary judgment reversed.

Lyman v. Solomon, 258 P.3d 647 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) (describing open-and-obvious danger rule as duty-defining in premises cases)
Coburn v. Whitaker Constr. Co., 445 P.3d 446 (Utah 2019) (acknowledging Restatement §§343/343A adoption and explaining exceptions)
Hale v. Beckstead, 116 P.3d 263 (Utah 2005) (open-and-obvious danger may still permit liability when facts suggest possessor should have anticipated invitee's exposure)
Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 215 P.3d 152 (Utah 2009) (foreseeability of harm turns on general foreseeability, not precise mechanism)
Jensen v. Gardner, 279 P.3d 844 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (affirming summary judgment where possessor could not reasonably anticipate invitee's unexpected conduct)
Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76 (Utah 1977) (court determines duty when facts in evidence permit reasonable jury findings)