Dowdye v. People
2011 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 34
Supreme Court of The Virgin Is...2011Background
- Dowdye appeals felonies including First Degree Murder and seeks a new trial.
- He contends the Sixth Amendment was violated by extensive voir dire on Freemasonry.
- He also challenges the removal of Juror 3 for allegedly exchanging Masonic gestures with Dowdye.
- The voir dire was prompted by a police tattoo report suggesting Masonic affiliation, not showing Dowdye as a Mason.
- Prior to deliberations, Juror 3 was removed; no pre-removal interview or Remmer-style hearing was conducted.
- On remand, the court must hold a Remmer-type hearing to assess whether Juror 3’s removal was proper and prejudicial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Freemasonry voir dire violate Dowdye’s Sixth Amendment rights? | Dowdye asserts extensive Mason-related questioning biased the panel. | Government contends voir dire reasonably sought to uncover bias without undue prejudice. | No violation; extensive voir dire permissible to uncover bias. |
| Was Juror 3’s removal from the jury proper without a record-based inquiry? | Dowdye argues removal lacked an adequate factual basis and pre-/removal interview. | People claim the court had discretion due to perceived bias and gestures. | Remanded for a Remmer-type hearing to determine propriety and prejudice. |
| Does the cumulative effect of voir dire and Juror 3’s removal violate Dowdye’s right to a fair trial? | Remains potentially prejudicial in aggregate; remand may address it. | Any cumulative effect is moot given the remand for Juror 3’s status. | Moot; no separate ruling needed beyond remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Cameron, 464 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1972) (removal of juror within discretion when impartiality impaired)
- Olszewski v. Spencer, 466 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2006) (juror conduct and impartiality; Remmer framework referenced)
- State v. Williams, 871 A.2d 744 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (juror dishonesty and oath-related impartiality issues discussed)
- Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) (presumption of prejudice; need for Remmer hearing)
- Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983) (ex parte juror communications require post-trial remedy)
- Phillips v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) (actual bias and Remmer-remedies framework clarified)
- McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984) (truthful voir dire as essential to impartial jury; bias disclosure)
- United States v. Bradley, 173 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999) (judicial notice of jurors in open court; limits on certainty)
- Remmer, Remmer II discussion, Not applicable here; cited in Remmer framework (1954-1956) (Remmer II clarifies breadth of inquiry after claimed jury tampering)
- Hinton v. United States, 979 A.2d 663 (D.C. 2009) (rule 24(c) remedial harmless-error analysis after abuse)