Dow Corning Trust v. Claimants' Advisory Committee
628 F.3d 769
6th Cir.2010Background
- Dow Corning filed Chapter 11 in 1995 to resolve thousands of breast-implant-related claims.
- The Amended Joint Plan created a $1.95 billion fund administered by the Settlement Facility-Dow Corning Trust for settling claims.
- Two district-court orders interpreted Plan definitions affecting payments: tissue expanders under 'Breast Implant' and Annex A's 'total disability.'
- The tissue-expanders dispute asks whether three breast-implant-specific expanders fall within the Plan's 'Breast Implant' definition.
- The total-disability dispute concerns whether the claimant must show disability in both vocational and self-care to qualify for enhanced payments.
- The Sixth Circuit vacates/remands the tissue-expander decision and reverses the total-disability decision, remanding for extrinsic-evidence considerations consistent with this opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard of review for plan interpretation | Dow Corning argues for limited deference to district court. | Committee contends some deference is warranted due to district court's familiarity. | Deference to district court's interpretation, with review for reasonableness and extrinsic-evidence assessment. |
| Whether tissue expanders are 'Breast Implants' under § 1.17 | Dow Corning contends expanders may be within 'Breast Implant' as designed for breast use. | Committee argues expanders are not 'Breast Implants' (term of art vs. ordinary use issues). | Ambiguous; remand to assess extrinsic evidence and defer to district court's determination. |
| Interpretation of total disability in Annex A | Dow Corning reads 'vocation or self-care' as conjunctive, requiring disability in both areas. | Committee reads 'or' as disjunctive, needing disability in either area. | Plan requires disability in both vocational and self-care activities. |
| Role of extrinsic evidence in ambiguity | Dow Corning seeks strict interpretation with limited extrinsic evidence. | Committee urges examination of extrinsic evidence to resolve ambiguity. | District court's assessment of extrinsic evidence controls; remand for proper consideration. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Dow Corning Corp., 456 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2006) (plan interpretation and deference standards in confirmed plans)
- In re Dow Corning Corp., 237 B.R. 364 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (bankruptcy court’s role in plan interpretation and evidence)
- In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 447 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2006) (deference in bankruptcy appeals from district courts)
- Madison Avenue Leasehold, LLC v. Madison Bentley Assocs. LLC, 811 N.Y.S.2d 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (term-of-art vs. ordinary-meaning interpretation under NY law)
- Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005) (contract interpretation and scope under specialized contexts)
- Tenorio v. Tenorio, 70 A.D.3d 812 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (ambiguity defined as more than one reasonable interpretation)