Dow Agrosciences LLC v. Superior Court
A150854
| Cal. Ct. App. | Nov 6, 2017Background
- CEH filed a Proposition 65 citizen-enforcement complaint in Alameda County alleging Dow’s soil fumigant (Telone, containing 1,3‑D) exposes Shafter residents/workers to a carcinogen without clear warnings; relief sought included statutory civil penalties and injunctive remedies.
- Dow is a nonresident corporate defendant with no designated California principal place of business; the alleged exposures occurred in Kern County.
- Dow moved to transfer venue to Kern County under CCP § 393(a), which makes the county where the cause arose the proper venue for actions to recover a statutory penalty or forfeiture.
- CEH opposed, arguing the main relief sought is equitable (injunction), the action is transitory (venue governed by CCP § 395(a)), and thus any California county is proper because Dow is nonresident.
- The trial court denied transfer, finding the primary relief was injunctive (not a ‘‘forfeiture’’) and that the action is transitory; the Court of Appeal reviewed de novo whether § 393(a) applies and granted mandamus to transfer to Kern County.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 393(a) applies to a Proposition 65 private enforcement action seeking statutory penalties and injunctions | CEH: § 393(a) does not apply because main relief is injunctive/transitory; venue therefore under § 395(a) and any county is proper for a nonresident defendant | Dow: Because CEH seeks statutory penalties (and injunctive relief incident to enforcement), § 393(a) governs and the proper court is the county where the cause arose (Kern) | Held: § 393(a) applies — an action to recover a statutory penalty (even when coupled with injunctive relief under Prop 65) makes the county where the cause arose the proper venue; transfer to Kern required |
| Whether the ‘main relief’ / local vs. transitory analysis controls application of § 393(a) | CEH: Court must identify main relief; if injunction predominates, action is transitory and § 395(a) applies | Dow: The complaint seeks statutory penalties; § 393(a) entitlement does not depend on local/transitory classification or which remedy predominates | Held: The main relief/local‑transitory construct is chiefly for real‑property (§ 392) disputes; it does not control § 393(a) application here because § 393(a)’s text governs actions to recover statutory penalties |
| Whether an injunction under Prop 65 is a ‘forfeiture’ for § 393(a) purposes | CEH: An injunction is not a ‘‘forfeiture’’; § 393(a) shouldn’t apply | Dow: The complaint seeks recovery of statutory penalties (and injunctive relief) bringing it squarely within § 393(a)’s language | Held: Court need not construe the injunction as a classic forfeiture; because the statute authorizes civil penalties and CEH seeks those penalties, the action falls within § 393(a) regardless of label |
| Whether Dow’s nonresident status permits venue in any county under § 395(a) despite § 393(a) | CEH: Nonresident defendant allows plaintiff to designate any county under § 395(a) | Dow: § 393(a) is an explicit exception specifying venue where cause arose and supersedes the nonresident provision of § 395(a) for penalty actions | Held: § 393(a) supplants the § 395(a) option; Dow’s nonresident status is irrelevant when § 393(a) applies |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 477 (Cal. 1984) (discusses venue rules and interaction of specialized statutory venue provisions with § 395)
- Peiser v. Mettler, 50 Cal.2d 594 (Cal. 1958) (explains transitory vs. local analysis and main‑relief rule in venue disputes)
- County of Riverside v. Superior Court, 69 Cal.2d 828 (Cal. 1968) (statutory venue provisions can override general venue rules)
- Regents of Univ. of California v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d 529 (Cal. 1970) (same principle: special venue provisions control)
- California State Parks Foundation v. Superior Court, 150 Cal.App.4th 826 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (applies § 393(b) to public‑right enforcement actions; treats statutory venue as controlling)
- DiPirro v. Bondo Corp., 153 Cal.App.4th 150 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (describes Proposition 65 as fundamentally equitable and informational; statutory penalties serve enforcement)