Douglas Michael Long, Jr. v. David J. Vitkauskas, 228 So. 3d 302

Plaintiff Douglas Long filed an alienation-of-affections suit in DeSoto County (Miss.) against Pennsylvania resident David Vitkauskas on March 17, 2014.
Long attempted service under Miss. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(5) by sending the summons and complaint to Vitkauskas’s workplace in Pennsylvania via certified mail marked “restricted delivery,” return receipt requested.
The USPS return receipt was signed by a person identified only as “Mary” (last name illegible); the return receipt and proof of restricted-delivery marking were presented to the trial court.
Vitkauskas made a special appearance and moved to dismiss for insufficient service, arguing the mailing went to his employer, not to him personally; the trial court granted the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Mississippi Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Rule 4(c)(5) service was sufficient and whether the trial court should have considered Long’s request for additional time to serve.
The Supreme Court held service under Rule 4(c)(5) was sufficient because a signed restricted-delivery return receipt gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of valid service; because defendant made no offer of proof contesting receipt or agency, the presumption was not overcome.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was service under Miss. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(5) sufficient where a restricted-delivery return receipt was signed by "Mary" at defendant's workplace?	Long: He complied with Rule 4(c)(5); restricted-delivery return receipt proves delivery and completes service.	Vitkauskas: Return receipt signed by "Mary," not him; service on employer/unknown signee is insufficient.	Service was sufficient: restricted-delivery return receipt creates a rebuttable presumption of valid service (signed by the addressee or authorized agent); defendant failed to object and offer proof to rebut.
Was the trial court required to grant additional time to serve after dismissal?	Long: Alternatively sought more time to serve because dismissal could render statute of limitations expired.	Vitkauskas: Not addressed substantively once service deemed insufficient.	Moot — because the Court held service was sufficient, request for additional time need not be reached.

McCain v. Dauzat, 791 So.2d 839 (Miss. 2001) (return of process is presumed correct)
Collins v. Westbrook, 184 So.3d 922 (Miss. 2016) (presumption may be rebutted with extrinsic evidence; testimony can overcome presumption)
Wesley Health Sys., LLC v. Estate of Love, 200 So.3d 440 (Miss. 2016) (discussing return-of-process presumption)
Wilburn v. Wilburn, 991 So.2d 1185 (Miss. 2008) (failure to object and offer proof defeats due-process claim re: service)
Lampton-Reid Co. v. Allen, 171 So. 780 (Miss. 1937) (testimony can rebut a return-of-process presumption)
Johnson v. Rao, 952 So.2d 151 (Miss. 2007) (de novo review of motion to dismiss)
Nelson v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp.-N. Miss., Inc., 70 So.3d 190 (Miss. 2011) (abuse-of-discretion standard for trial court factual findings on service)