Douglas County v. Archie
295 Neb. 674
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Daniel Archie, a long‑time Douglas County Youth Center (DCYC) employee and former high‑school teacher, was terminated after an audio recording and allegations surfaced that he had a sexual relationship with a former student while she was a minor.
- DCYC terminated Archie for (1) immoral/notoriously disgraceful conduct prejudicial to the county (Manual art. 22 § 5(19)) and (2) falsification/intentional omission on his DCYC employment applications (Manual art. 22 § 5(13)).
- Archie appealed to the Douglas County Civil Service Commission, which heard testimony, admitted documents (including an OPS letter and an audio clip), and voted 3–0 to reverse the termination and order reinstatement.
- Douglas County sought review via petition in error; the district court affirmed the Commission. The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed the district court in a split decision, reinstating the termination. Archie petitioned to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
- The Supreme Court framed the review under the substantial/sufficient evidence and arbitrary‑and‑capricious standards, giving deference to the Commission’s factual findings and credibility determinations.
- The Supreme Court concluded there was sufficient, relevant evidence to support the Commission’s rulings that Archie did not violate §§ 5(19) or 5(13), that the Commission’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious, and reversed the Court of Appeals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Archie) | Defendant's Argument (Douglas County) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Archie’s conduct violated Manual art. 22 § 5(19) (dishonest/immoral conduct prejudicial to county) | Preemployment conduct (if proven) does not necessarily prejudice the county; Archie’s long, exemplary service and DCYC’s prior knowledge undercut prejudice | Archie’s admitted sexual relationship with a former student is immoral/disgraceful and damages county reputation, justifying termination | Commission reasonably found no § 5(19) violation; sufficient evidence supported reinstatement and decision was not arbitrary or capricious |
| Whether Archie intentionally omitted required information on his DCYC applications (Manual art. 22 § 5(13)) | Application answers (“spend time w/ kids” / “Family”) were generic, public‑record concerns make fuller disclosure unnecessary, and DCYC knew enough to inquire further; omission was not intentional | Failure to disclose the student relationship (or its investigation) was an intentional omission/falsification warranting termination | Commission reasonably concluded no intentional omission; sufficient evidence and credibility findings support reinstatement |
| Whether the Commission exceeded authority by considering PREA materials or failed to make required findings | Any PREA review did not form the basis of the reinstatement; Commission properly reviewed employability and merits; credibility determinations suffice without detailed findings | Consideration of PREA materials or lack of detailed findings prejudiced DCYC and exceeded Commission authority | Court found PREA materials did not affect outcome and DCYC failed to preserve claim re findings; no prejudice shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Fleming v. Civil Serv. Comm. of Douglas Cty., 280 Neb. 1014 (standard that reviewing court must defer to agency’s sufficient, relevant evidence finding)
- Blakely v. Lancaster County, 284 Neb. 659 (arbitrary and capricious standard for agency action)
- Eshom v. Board of Ed. of Sch. Dist. No. 54, 219 Neb. 467 (purpose of proceeding in error and substantial evidence standard)
- Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607 (definition of substantial evidence review)
- Myers v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irr. Dist., 159 Neb. 493 (deference to agency/jury‑verdict analogy)
- Central Platte Natural Resources Dist. v. City of Fremont, 250 Neb. 252 (deference and arbitrary/capricious framework)
- Pierce v. Douglas County Civil Serv. Comm., 275 Neb. 722 (civil service commission’s adjudicatory role)
- Prescott v. Jones, 13 Neb. 534 (principle that appellate review defers to factfinder when evidence supports findings)
