Douglas B. Moseley v. Sherrie Arnold
06-15-00031-CV
| Tex. App. | Nov 24, 2015Background
- Moseley (plaintiff/appellant) challenges a final judgment that granted summary judgment to Arnold (defendant) and denied his motion for partial summary judgment regarding a deed restriction on a 5-acre tract.
- The deed restriction was created roughly 29–30 years earlier to protect a truck stop (Moseley’s Truck Stop) sold in 1985; the truck stop burned and ceased operation over 24 years ago.
- Moseley’s affidavit (submitted with his summary-judgment motion) asserts changed circumstances: destruction of the truck stop, long nonuse of the restricted purpose, multiple transfers of the benefitted property, and that Arnold was unaware of the restriction when she bought the 5-acre parcel.
- Arnold’s affidavit does not dispute many factual assertions but contends the restriction benefits her parcel by preventing competition for a truck/fuel stop across I-20 and thus increases her land’s value.
- Plaintiff argues these uncontested facts and the equitable doctrine of changed circumstances required trial rather than summary disposition; the trial court nevertheless entered summary judgment for Arnold.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether changed circumstances excuse or invalidate the deed restriction | Moseley: destruction and long nonuse of the specific truck stop, transfer history, and changed traffic/economic conditions constitute changed circumstances warranting relief; facts largely uncontroverted and require a trial | Arnold: restriction continues to serve its purpose by protecting her parcel from competition by preventing a truck/fuel stop on the adjacent 6.379-acre tract | Appellate brief argues trial court erred in granting summary judgment; remand requested (court decision in this brief is to reverse and remand) |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate on a highly factual, equitable doctrine | Moseley: doctrine is fact-intensive and balancing-based; summary judgment was improper because material facts are disputed or unaddressed by defendant | Arnold: contends restriction still prevents competition and preserves value (basis for summary judgment) | Appellant contends the grant of summary judgment was erroneous and demands remand for full evidentiary hearing |
Key Cases Cited
- Bob Pagan Ford, Inc. v. Smith, 638 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982) (changed-circumstances doctrine is equitable and highly fact-specific; courts must balance interests and hardships)
- Davis v. Canyon Creek Estates Homeowners Ass’n., 350 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011) (factors for assessing changed circumstances include size/location of restricted area, type of change, parties’ conduct, purpose of restriction, and remaining term)
- Am. Dream at Marlboro, L.L.C. v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of Marlboro, 35 A.3d 1198 (N.J. 2012) (illustrative authority recognizing the factual nature of changed-circumstances inquiries and rarity of summary disposition)