Douglas B. Moseley v. Sherrie Arnold, 06-15-00031-CV

Background

In 1985 Moseley sold a 5-acre truck-stop parcel to Gorman and, as part of the sale, recorded a restrictive covenant (Deed Restriction) limiting Moseley’s use of his retained 6.3-acre parcel across the highway to avoid competition with the truck stop.
The Deed Restriction expressly states it is for the benefit of "Robert T. Gorman and wife, Nancy S. Gorman, and their successors and assigns."
Gorman defaulted; the 5 acres was foreclosed in 1988 and subsequently sold multiple times (six transfers total); none of the successors obtained an assignment of the Deed Restriction and none redeveloped the parcel as a truck stop.
The original truck stop burned, was removed, and the 5-acre tract has not been used as a truck/fuel stop for over two decades.
In 2013 Moseley entered a contract to sell the 6.3 acres; the buyer’s title company flagged the recorded Deed Restriction after defendant Arnold asserted enforcement, which blocked the closing.
Procedural posture: Moseley sued for declaratory relief seeking a ruling the Deed Restriction is unenforceable (lack of standing and changed conditions). Trial court denied Moseley’s partial summary judgment, granted Arnold’s summary judgment, and entered final judgment for Arnold; Moseley appeals.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held (trial court)
Standing to enforce the Deed Restriction	Moseley: the restriction names only Gorman (and his successors/assignees); Arnold never received an assignment, so she lacks standing.	Arnold: she has enforceable rights (implicitly asserting beneficiary status or privity).	Trial court granted Arnold summary judgment (allowed enforcement).
Whether an assignment or privity exists	Moseley: no assignment of the restriction from Gorman to any successor; warranty deed did not reference the restriction.	Arnold: disputed standing but offered only a conclusory affidavit asserting value enhancement.	Trial court found for Arnold on summary judgment.
Changed-conditions / abandonment doctrine	Moseley: the truck stop was destroyed, removed, property foreclosed and resold repeatedly; the covenant’s purpose is defeated — genuine fact issues preclude summary judgment.	Arnold: the absence of an active truck stop does not defeat her benefit; changed conditions do not apply as a matter of law.	Trial court rejected Moseley’s changed-conditions arguments and granted Arnold summary judgment.
Effect of foreclosure and subsequent sales on enforceability	Moseley: foreclosure and successive sales without assignment show abandonment and defeat the covenant’s purpose; foreclosure purchaser did not obtain enforcement rights.	Arnold: asserted continued benefit without showing assignment; relied on recorded restriction.	Trial court sustained Arnold’s position and entered final judgment for defendant.

Key Cases Cited

Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. 2010) (standard of review for summary judgment is de novo).
Pilarcik v. Emmons, 966 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1998) (restrictive covenants are construed like contracts; intent is determined from the instrument).
Inwood North Homeowners' Ass'n v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1987) (elements for covenants running with the land).
Wilmoth v. Wilcox, 734 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1987) (restrictive covenants not favored; ambiguities resolved for free use of land).
Cowling v. Colligan, 312 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. 1958) (changed conditions may justify cancellation/modification of covenants when original purpose destroyed).
Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985) (summary judgment burden and evidence standards).