981 F.3d 128
1st Cir.2020Background
- Doughty and Severance were New Hampshire state employees who, as non‑union members, paid union "agency fees" required by collective bargaining agreements prior to Janus.
- Janus v. AFSCME held such compelled agency fees unconstitutional and was applied retroactively; plaintiffs sued the State Employees' Association of New Hampshire under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retrospective damages and restitution.
- By the time of suit the Union had stopped collecting fees; plaintiffs alleged state payroll deductions remitted the fees to the Union but pleaded no detailed collection mechanics.
- The District Court assumed (for purposes of the motion) Janus applied retroactively and the Union was a proper § 1983 defendant, but dismissed the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
- The District Court concluded plaintiffs’ damages claim could not proceed because common‑law analogies and reliance interests require proof of malice or bad faith for retrospective liability; it also rejected restitution because plaintiffs failed to trace specific funds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1983 allows retroactive money damages against a private union for agency fees collected before Janus | § 1983's text imposes absolute liability for constitutional deprivations; Janus is retroactive, so damages should follow | Retroactive liability would upset reliance interests; common‑law analogies counsel against liability when conduct was lawful when done | Court affirmed dismissal: § 1983 must be read against common‑law background; reliance interests and tort analogies counsel against retrospective damages |
| Whether common‑law tort analogies require malice/ improper use of process, barring recovery here | Plaintiffs: First Amendment claim is distinct; conversion is the best analogue and does not require malice | Union: Claim parallels abuse of process/malicious prosecution analogies that require malicious or improper purpose; those elements cannot be met because fees were lawful under Abood | Held: Claim parallels misuse‑of‑state‑process torts; those require malice/improper use and cannot be satisfied because the collections were lawful when made |
| Whether conversion supplies a tort analogue allowing damages without showing malice | Plaintiffs: Conversion fits because fees were taken and conversion does not require malice | Union: No common‑law support that conversion covered undifferentiated, commingled fees collected under a then‑lawful requirement | Held: Plaintiffs failed to show a common‑law conversion analogue; common law required identifiable funds and did not support retrospective liability |
| Whether equitable restitution is available absent traceable, identifiable funds | Plaintiffs seek restitution under § 1983 in equity for forced payments | Union: Plaintiffs cannot trace payments to identifiable union funds; equity remedies therefore unavailable | Held: Restitution fails because plaintiffs did not plead traceability; the claim is effectively a legal claim against the union treasury and is not recoverable in equity |
Key Cases Cited
- Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (overruling Abood; holding compelled agency fees violate the First Amendment)
- Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (prior precedent permitting agency fees)
- Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (§ 1983 remedies evaluated against common‑law tort rules for damages)
- Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (§ 1983 read against tort liability background)
- Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992) (private defendants and § 1983; discussion of reliance and common‑law analogies)
- Great‑West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (equitable restitution requires traceable, identifiable funds)
- Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993) (retroactivity principles for judicial decisions)
- Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (courts must attend to values of constitutional right when adapting common‑law rules to § 1983)
- Diamond v. Pa. State Educ. Ass’n, 972 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2020) (collecting circuits rejecting retroactive Janus damages claims under § 1983)
- Ogle v. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Ass’n, 951 F.3d 794 (6th Cir. 2020) (similar rejection of retroactive Janus‑based damages claims)