527 S.W.3d 732
Ark. Ct. App.2017Background
- Mother (Doughty) moved with the child (E.D.) from California to Hot Springs, Arkansas, in Sept. 2012 without informing father (Douglas), an Australian resident.
- Father filed a paternity/parental-relationship petition in California (Mar. 2013); mother filed in Garland County, Arkansas (Apr. 2013).
- California court questioned its jurisdiction, stayed its proceedings, and conveyed to the Arkansas court that Arkansas should assume jurisdiction.
- Arkansas court telephoned the California court, then accepted jurisdiction and awarded joint custody in Oct. 2014; mother’s direct appeal was later dismissed for briefing defects.
- Douglas cross-appealed, arguing (1) Arkansas lacked UCCJEA jurisdiction (communication record, failure to allow proof of mother’s alleged unjustifiable conduct, erroneous refusal to decline jurisdiction) and (2) Arkansas abused its discretion in awarding interim attorney’s fees to mother.
- Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed jurisdictional rulings but affirmed in part and reversed in part the interim-fee awards (affirming Dec. 2013 award; reversing May and Aug. 2014 awards).
Issues
| Issue | Doughty’s Argument | Douglas’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Arkansas erred under UCCJEA by failing to make a record of its communication with California | Arkansas accurately summarized California’s position; parties were given notice and opportunity and acquiesced | Arkansas violated Ark. Code § 9-19-110(d) by failing to make a record and by misstating California’s prior statements | No reversible error; Douglas did not timely object and effectively acquiesced; California had declined jurisdiction to Arkansas |
| Whether Douglas was denied opportunity to present facts on mother’s alleged unjustifiable conduct before Arkansas assumed jurisdiction | Arkansas allowed adequate opportunity; California had declined jurisdiction leaving Arkansas as the only forum | Arkansas decided jurisdiction without permitting full presentation on alleged unjustifiable conduct | No reversible error; court did not clearly err and Douglas had chances to contest jurisdiction |
| Whether Arkansas should have found mother engaged in unjustifiable conduct and thus declined jurisdiction under § 9-19-208 | Even if mother engaged in unjustifiable conduct, California had declined jurisdiction so no other state would have jurisdiction | Mother obtained jurisdiction in Arkansas by unjustifiable conduct and court should have declined to exercise jurisdiction | Court did not abuse discretion; because no other state would have jurisdiction if Arkansas declined, refusal to decline was permissible under § 9-19-208(3) |
| Whether Arkansas should have declined jurisdiction as an inconvenient forum under UCCJEA § 9-19-207 | Arkansas was the child’s home state and appropriate forum | Arkansas should have declined in favor of California or otherwise | No abuse of discretion; California had declined, Arkansas was proper forum |
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding interim attorney’s fees to Doughty | Fees are permissible in paternity actions; trial court considered counsel time, skill, and case complexity | Trial court improperly based awards solely on income disparity | Mixed: December 2013 fee award affirmed (court considered appropriate factors); May and August 2014 awards reversed as abuses of discretion because they appear based primarily on Douglas’s greater ability to pay |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. Williamson, 359 Ark. 33, 194 S.W.3d 197 (Ark. 2004) (statutory authority and procedure for awarding fees in paternity actions)
- Thomas v. Avant, 370 Ark. 377, 260 S.W.3d 266 (Ark. 2007) (standard of review for UCCJEA matters and factual findings)
- Ullrich v. Walsh, 373 S.W.3d 413 (Ark. App. 2010) (de novo review of UCCJEA questions while factual findings reviewed for clear error)
- Hatfield v. Miller, 373 S.W.3d 366 (Ark. App. 2009) (trial court discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction under UCCJEA)
- Scudder v. Ramsey, 2013 Ark. 115, 426 S.W.3d 427 (Ark. 2013) (circuit court’s inherent authority to award attorney’s fees in domestic-relations matters)