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Dougan v. Bradshaw
198 So. 3d 878
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2016
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Background

  • In June 2013 Palm Beach County deputies performed a Baker Act/safety check after a family member reported Dougan might be suicidal; officers took his lawfully owned firearms but did not arrest or admit him for involuntary examination.
  • The Sheriff’s office refused Dougan’s requests for return, stating firearms would not be returned without a court order.
  • Dougan filed a replevin action, obtained a court order requiring return of the firearms, and then filed this suit under Fla. Stat. § 790.33 alleging the Sheriff enforced an unlawful policy of retaining firearms seized during safety checks absent a court order.
  • The trial court dismissed Dougan’s complaint with prejudice; he appealed.
  • The core legal question was whether the Sheriff’s alleged policy was authorized by statute or an administrative order, and whether Dougan’s federal/state-law or statutory remedy under § 790.33 survived dismissal and was barred by res judicata.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether complaint states a cause under Fla. Stat. § 790.33 (preemption/private cause for unlawful local firearms regulations) Dougan: Sheriff had an unlawful policy (retain firearms after safety checks absent court order) that regulated firearms and thus violated § 790.33 Sheriff: Policy was required/authorized by the 15th Circuit Administrative Order quoting Fla. Stat. § 933.14(3) so no unlawful local regulation exists Court: Reversed dismissal — Dougan alleged facts sufficient under § 790.33 because the administrative order could not expand statutory authority and § 933.14(3) did not require retaining firearms absent a "breach of the peace" or criminal charges
Whether § 933.14(3) (return of firearms only by court order) authorized retention after a Baker Act/safety check Dougan: Baker Act and its protections show suicidal behavior alone is not a crime and does not constitute a statutory "breach of the peace" to justify retention Sheriff: § 933.14(3) (as applied via the administrative order) mandated retention until court order Court: Baker Act language and authority (including AG opinion and persuasive federal decision) indicate mental-health evaluation alone is not a breach of the peace; § 933.14(3) did not require retention here
Whether the chief judge's administrative order could lawfully expand statutory authority to require retention Dougan: Administrative orders are limited to court administration and cannot amend statutes or add conditions Sheriff: Administrative order effectively implemented § 933.14(3) in the circuit Court: Administrative orders cannot amend statutes; if statute does not authorize retention, the administrative order cannot supply that authority
Whether res judicata from the replevin action bars Dougan's § 790.33 suit Sheriff: Replevin judgment over firearms return precludes further litigation about retention policy Dougan: Replevin sought return of property; § 790.33 suit seeks damages and injunction for an unlawful policy — different causes and things sued for Court: Res judicata does not bar suit — the prior replevin and the § 790.33 claim lack identity of the thing sued for and identity of the cause of action

Key Cases Cited

  • Merovich v. Huzenman, 911 So.2d 125 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (standard of review and rules on motion to dismiss)
  • Hatcher v. Davis, 798 So.2d 765 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (administrative orders cannot amend statutes)
  • Dep't of Juvenile Justice v. Soud, 685 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (striking administrative order that effectively amended statute)
  • Edwards v. State, 462 So.2d 581 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (definition of "breach of the peace")
  • B.A.A. v. State, 333 So.2d 552 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (discussion of breach of the peace concept)
  • Eight Hundred, Inc. v. State, 895 So.2d 1185 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (elements to recover return of seized property in replevin context)
  • Tyson v. Viacom, Inc., 890 So.2d 1205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (res judicata identity-of-claims analysis)
  • Holt v. Brown's Repair Serv., Inc., 780 So.2d 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (four identities required for res judicata)
  • Rollet v. de Bizemont, 159 So.3d 351 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (lack of transcript does not prevent appellate review of legal sufficiency on motion to dismiss)

Result: Reversed dismissal; remanded for further proceedings because Dougan sufficiently pled a § 790.33 claim and res judicata did not bar the suit.

Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: Dougan v. Bradshaw
Court Name: District Court of Appeal of Florida
Date Published: Jul 13, 2016
Citation: 198 So. 3d 878
Docket Number: No. 4D15-2123
Court Abbreviation: Fla. Dist. Ct. App.