Doucette v. Massachusetts Parole Board
86 Mass. App. Ct. 531
| Mass. App. Ct. | 2014Background
- Charles Doucette was released on parole from a life sentence for second‑degree murder in 2007 subject to conditions (AA attendance, notify parole officer of residence changes, avoid certain persons, pay supervision fee, follow officer's instructions).
- In 2011 Doucette was arrested on assault, witness intimidation, and threats arising from an incident with his then‑girlfriend; a parole detainer issued and a preliminary revocation hearing recommended revocation.
- The hearing examiner’s preliminary revocation decision and the board chair’s March 23, 2011 decision were not provided to Doucette at that time; a final revocation panel hearing occurred July 20, 2011 and the full board voted to revoke on November 10, 2011 but did not notify him until January 13, 2012 (after he filed mandamus). He was later acquitted at trial of the criminal charges.
- Doucette sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (due process/bias) and sought certiorari under G. L. c. 249, § 4 to challenge the board’s revocation as arbitrary and capricious.
- The Superior Court granted judgment for the board; the Appeals Court affirmed, finding procedural irregularities insufficient to establish a due process violation and that other parole violations supported revocation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bias of board chair / impartial tribunal | Chair publicly stated desire to return Doucette to prison for life, showing prejudgment | No extrajudicial bias; any claim should have been raised below | Bias claim waived because Doucette knew of the report but did not seek recusal or raise it before the board; not preserved on appeal |
| Right to confront adverse witness at preliminary hearing | Reliance on police reports and affidavit of girlfriend denied right to confront/cross‑examine | Preliminary hearings need only probable cause; regulations permit hearsay if reliable or good cause shown | No prejudice shown; Doucette waived confrontation issue at final hearing by not requesting the witness there; reliable hearsay may suffice for preliminary stage |
| Delay / late written decision and notice | Board delayed issuing written decision well beyond regulatory time limits, violating due process | Delay alone isn’t per se violation; must show fundamental unfairness/prejudice | Although delay (177 days) was improper, Doucette showed no legal prejudice; remedy was to seek prompt decision (he filed mandamus) not automatic release |
| Revocation based on arrest and sufficiency of other grounds (certiorari review) | Revocation rested on arrest (for which he was acquitted); board failed to make clear findings whether it relied on arrest or proved misconduct by preponderance | Board may consider pattern of irresponsible conduct and other admitted violations; standard is preponderance at final hearing | Even if board’s findings about the arrest were unclear, other independent violations (failure to attend AA, allowing unauthorized resident, continued relationship despite warnings, unpaid fees) supported revocation; not arbitrary or capricious |
Key Cases Cited
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (establishes minimum due process protections for parole revocation)
- Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (parallels due process requirements for probation/parole revocation)
- Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108 (permits reliable hearsay in revocation proceedings where good cause exists)
- Commonwealth v. Bukin, 467 Mass. 516 (substantial reliability of hearsay satisfies good cause in revocation contexts)
- Stefanik v. Board of Parole, 372 Mass. 726 (addresses standards for parole revocation proceedings)
- Commonwealth v. Holmgren, 421 Mass. 224 (preponderance standard for final revocation hearings)
- Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 84 Mass. App. Ct. 537 (extrajudicial comments by adjudicator can indicate bias and violate due process)