139 So. 3d 860
Fla.2014Background
- Dorsey was assaulted in 2007 after an altercation with Reider and Reider’s friend Noordhoek in a bar parking lot; Noordhoek struck Dorsey in the head with a tomahawk taken from Reider’s truck.
- Dorsey sued Reider for negligence; a jury awarded substantial damages for past/future pain and suffering, medical expenses, and lost wages.
- On appeal the Third District reversed, holding Reider owed no duty to prevent Noordhoek’s misconduct because Reider neither colluded with nor had control over Noordhoek or the weapon at the time of the assault.
- The Florida Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the district court misapplied McCain v. Florida Power Corp. in deciding duty.
- The Supreme Court held Reider created a foreseeable zone of risk by blocking Dorsey’s escape and leaving a tomahawk accessible in his unlocked truck while present at the scene, and that under these facts Reider owed a duty extending to the third party’s misconduct.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Reider owed Dorsey a legal duty arising from his conduct | Reider’s blocking of Dorsey and the accessible tomahawk created a foreseeable zone of risk, so duty exists | No duty because Reider didn’t collude with or control Noordhoek or foresee the specific tomahawk attack | Held: Duty existed; Reider’s conduct created a foreseeable zone of risk as a matter of law |
| Whether duty extends to misconduct of a third party | Duty extends where defendant had actual/constructive control of instrumentality or premises and was present | General rule: no duty to prevent third‑party misconduct absent control or special relationship | Held: Exception applies — Reider had constructive/actual control of truck/instrumentality and premises while blocking escape, so duty extended to Noordhoek’s act |
| Proper application of McCain’s foreseeability test | McCain requires only general foreseeability (zone of risk), not foreseeability of the exact harm | District court required a stronger showing that the same type of injury was likely | Held: McCain requires only that defendant’s conduct created a general zone of risk; district court misapplied McCain by demanding foreseeability of specific injury |
| Whether case should be resolved as matter of law or for the jury | Existence of duty is legal (court); breach and proximate cause are factual (jury) | District court resolved lack of duty as a matter of law, removing question from jury | Held: Existence of duty is a threshold legal question satisfied here; breach/proximate causation remain for the factfinder |
Key Cases Cited
- McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So.2d 500 (Fla. 1992) (duty flows from foreseeable "zone of risk"; duty is legal question distinct from proximate cause)
- Reider v. Dorsey, 98 So.3d 1223 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (district court opinion reversing plaintiff; at issue for conflict review)
- Michael & Philip, Inc. v. Sierra, 776 So.2d 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (discusses limits of duty where defendant provided access to instrumentality but was not present at injury)
- Mathis v. Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 505 So.2d 652 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (no duty where gun owner was absent and third party used weapon)
- Keenan v. Oshman Sporting Goods Co., 629 So.2d 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (no duty where firearm was stolen from store display and later used in homicide)