Dorsey v. Redman
626 Pa. 195
Pa.2014Background
- Decedent died intestate in 2006. Cheryl Keefer petitioned for letters of administration; the Register of Wills (Redman) initially refused because she was not next of kin and lacked a death certificate.
- Orphan’s court issued an order directing the Register to issue letters to Keefer without requiring a death certificate; the Register issued letters but did not require a fiduciary bond. Keefer later filed an inventory showing substantial estate assets.
- A putative heir, Elvira Dorsey, later obtained removal of Keefer, a judgment against Keefer for missing estate assets, and then sued the Register and his surety under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3172 (register liable if letters are granted without required bond).
- The Register and his surety moved for summary judgment asserting immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act) and official immunity; trial court granted summary judgment.
- Commonwealth Court vacated and remanded, holding immunity was not automatic under the Tort Claims Act post-Meyer and that official-immunity questions were fact issues. Supreme Court granted allowance to resolve (1) whether §3172 claims are barred by the Tort Claims Act and (2) whether the official-immunity issue is for court or jury.
Issues
| Issue | Dorsey (Plaintiff) Argument | Redman (Defendant) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a register is immune under the Tort Claims Act for liability under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3172 (failure to secure bond) | §3172 creates a statutory liability outside Tort Claims Act immunity; without remedy §3172 is a de facto repeal and heirs lack protection | Tort Claims Act generally immunizes local agencies/employees from tort liability; §3172 sounds in tort and thus is barred (or displaced) by later-enacted Tort Claims Act | §3172 is a specific statutory accountability scheme that survives the Tort Claims Act; the Register is not immune from §3172 liability (statutory construction favors giving effect to the specific bond-liability provision) |
| Whether the question of official immunity under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8546(2) — i.e., whether the official’s conduct was authorized/required by law or reasonably believed to be so — is for the court (as a preliminary legal question) or for the fact-finder | Official-immunity inquiry raises factual disputes (e.g., whether the duty was absolute or discretionary; context of orphan’s court order), so it is for the fact-finder | Official immunity is an immunity from suit and, like qualified immunity in federal practice, is a preliminary question for the court to resolve before trial | The issue is a mixed question of law and fact but, as a threshold immunity determination, is for the court to decide preliminarily; remanded for the orphan’s court to consider official immunity on a developed factual record |
Key Cases Cited
- Meyer v. Comty. Coll. of Beaver Cnty., 2 A.3d 499 (Pa. 2010) (Tort Claims Act immunity does not mechanically apply to all statutory causes of action; analyze statutory intent)
- Antonis v. Liberati, 821 A.2d 666 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (recorder of deeds held immune where statute used neglect language and claim sounded in tort)
- Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 305 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1973) (abolition of common-law governmental immunity)
- Mayle v. Pa. Dep’t of Highways, 388 A.2d 709 (Pa. 1978) (abolition of sovereign immunity)
- Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (U.S. 1991) (qualified-immunity principles: immunity typically decided by court before trial)
- Commonwealth to Use of Colonial Trust Co. of Reading v. Gregory, 104 A. 562 (Pa. 1918) (historical authority holding a register liable for failing to secure a fiduciary bond)