Doris Freyre v. Chad Cronister, 910 F.3d 1371

Background

Florida law allowed DCF to contract with county sheriffs to perform child-protective investigations under statutory grant agreements; HCSO assumed responsibility in Hillsborough County under such a Grant Agreement in 2006.
In 2011 HCSO investigators removed MAF from his mother Doris Freyre’s care and transferred him to an out-of-county facility; MAF died soon after.
Freyre sued HCSO, the State, the sheriff (official-capacity), and individual investigators under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The district court granted summary judgment for most defendants and denied HCSO’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign-immunity defense as to Freyre’s associational ADA claim; HCSO appealed interlocutorily.
The Eleventh Circuit limited its review to the Eleventh Amendment question (collateral-order jurisdiction) and declined pendent appellate review of the other merits issues.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether HCSO is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity when performing child-protective investigations under the DCF Grant Agreement	Freyre: HCSO acted as a county actor and may be sued; sovereign immunity not applicable	HCSO: When performing child-protective investigations pursuant to the Grant Agreement it functions as an arm of the State and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity	Court held HCSO is not an arm of the state for this function; Eleventh Amendment immunity denied (affirming district court)
Applicability of the Manders four-factor arm-of-state test to HCSO’s conduct	Freyre: factors favor county status (county officer, local control, insurance/self-funded)	HCSO: factors (state standards, state funding for the investigations) show state control and state funding, favoring immunity	Court applied Manders: first factor (state law definition) weighed against arm status; second factor (degree of state control) neutral; third (funding) favored state; fourth (responsibility for judgments) weighed against state — overall not an arm of the state
Whether a judgment would be paid from the state treasury (source-of-payment factor)	Freyre: Florida law and HCSO’s self-insurance/self-funding mean state treasury would not pay judgments	HCSO: testimony claimed grant funds would be used to pay any judgment, supporting state liability	Court held state treasury would not be responsible (statutes permit sheriff liability insurance/self-insurance and no state-law provision requires state to satisfy sheriff judgments); this factor weighed against arm-of-state status
Whether the Court should exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over additional merits (standing, summary-judgment rulings)	Freyre: cross-appealed district court’s summary-judgment grants; these are reviewable if intertwined with immunity	HCSO: argued standing and merits issues bear on outcome and should be reviewed now	Court declined pendent appellate jurisdiction: immunity question is separable and reviewable now; other merits/standing issues are not effectively unreviewable and will await final judgment

Key Cases Cited

Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003) (articulates four-factor test for arm-of-the-state analysis)
Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 405 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2005) (Florida sheriffs presumptively county officers; sheriff may act as arm of the state for some functions)
Stanley v. Israel, 843 F.3d 920 (11th Cir. 2016) (examines Manders factors for sheriff functions; discusses importance of funding and control)
Rosario v. Am. Corrective Counseling Servs., Inc., 506 F.3d 1039 (11th Cir. 2007) (labels like "independent contractor" are legally significant in immunity analysis)
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993) (orders denying Eleventh Amendment immunity are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine)
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978) (explains collateral-order test)
Summit Med. Assocs. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 1999) (limits pendent appellate jurisdiction; standing not reviewable under collateral-order doctrine)
Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994) (source-of-payment is a critical factor in arm-of-state analysis)