Dorian Lee v. State of Indiana
91 N.E.3d 978
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- In 1995 Dorian Lee and two co-defendants broke into a home, Lee raped one victim and participated in shooting four victims; Victor Hill was killed and three others survived. Lee was convicted of murder, burglary, three counts of attempted murder, and rape; convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.
- Lee filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) in 2003 and an amended PCR in 2015 raising multiple ineffective-assistance claims against trial and appellate counsel; evidentiary hearings occurred in 2016.
- Central contested issues involved jury instructions (particularly accomplice liability and attempted murder intent), sufficiency of evidence for attempted murder, impeachment/discovery strategy, severance, and admissibility of a firearm seized from a third party’s residence.
- The PCR court denied relief in January 2017; Lee appealed pro se. The Court of Appeals reviewed claims under the Strickland standard and Indiana PCR waiver/res judicata principles.
- The court rejected all PCR claims, holding trial counsel’s performance was not deficient (or not prejudicial), many arguments were foreclosed by then-existing law or res judicata/waiver, and Lee lacked standing to challenge the warrantless search of a third party’s residence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial counsel ineffective for not objecting to accomplice-liability instructions for murder | Jury instructions failed to require that the principal had knowing/intentional mens rea for murder, so counsel should have objected | Indiana law permits conviction for murder as an accomplice if defendant intended or knew the victim would be killed even if principal lacked same mens rea | Denied — counsel not ineffective; instruction consistent with controlling precedent |
| Trial counsel ineffective for not objecting to attempted-murder instructions (use of "knowingly") | Instructions used "knowingly," which could mislead jury about required specific intent to kill (Spradlin) | Instructions read as a whole required specific intent to kill; Spradlin-type error avoided | Denied — no Spradlin error; counsel not ineffective |
| Trial counsel ineffective for not objecting to accomplice instructions and prosecutor argument re: attempted murder intent | Accomplice instruction and prosecutor’s argument allowed conviction as accomplice without specific intent to kill | At time of 1995 trial, law did not require accomplice instructions to state specific intent for attempted murder; counsel not required to anticipate later changes (Rosales decided in 2015) | Denied — counsel not ineffective because precedent at trial did not mandate such an objection |
| Instructions created unconstitutional mandatory presumption | Accomplice language effectively presumed mens rea, shifting burden to defendant | Instructions used permissive language and, read with attempted-murder instructions requiring specific intent, did not create a mandatory presumption | Denied — no mandatory presumption; counsel not ineffective |
| Insufficient evidence for attempted murder of Janice Boyd | No pellets/wounds proved; shots didn’t hit her, so insufficient evidence of attempt | Attempt requires specific intent plus substantial step; firing a deadly weapon at a person can show intent even if no injury resulted | Denied — evidence of firing at Boyd sufficed; counsel not ineffective for failing to challenge sufficiency |
| Failure to impeach witnesses / investigate discovery / seek severance | Counsel failed to properly impeach inconsistent statements, investigate discovery, or request separate trial when co-defendant’s counsel argued prejudicially | Counsel did impeach witnesses, reviewed discovery, and repeatedly sought severance; severance/semi-identical claim already raised on direct appeal | Denied — tactical decisions reasonable, record shows counsel acted, and severance issue is res judicata |
| Failure to object to firearm admission from warrantless search | Counsel should have objected; search of homeowner’s house was illegal | Lee lacked Fourth Amendment standing (didn’t live there); no record proof of possessory interest under state constitution; objection would not succeed | Denied — Lee lacked standing; counsel not ineffective |
| Appellate counsel ineffective for not raising trial-counsel errors on appeal | Appellate counsel failed to raise trial counsel’s ineffective assistance | To prevail must show appellate counsel deficient and that the underlying trial-counsel claims were themselves deficient and prejudicial | Denied — underlying trial counsel claims failed, so appellate claim fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-prong ineffective assistance of counsel test)
- Lee v. State, 684 N.E.2d 1143 (Ind. 1997) (direct appeal affirming Lee’s convictions; referenced here for factual background and prior review)
- Rosales v. State, 23 N.E.3d 8 (Ind. 2015) (held accomplice instructions must reflect specific-intent requirement when both direct and accomplice theories are at issue)
- Bethel v. State, 730 N.E.2d 1242 (Ind. 2000) (addressed accomplice liability for attempted murder)
- Spradlin v. State, 569 N.E.2d 948 (Ind. 1991) (required specific intent instruction for direct liability attempted murder)
- Winegeart v. State, 665 N.E.2d 893 (Ind. 1996) (permissive inference vs. mandatory presumption analysis)
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (standing for Fourth Amendment claims)
- Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591 (Ind. 2001) (standards for appellate counsel ineffectiveness claims in PCR proceedings)