Doreen Rubio// Jamie Walsh v. Jamie Walsh Emmet Walsh Ellen Thornton, Individually Ellen Thornton, Trustee And Ellen Thornton, Trustee// Cross-Appellee, Doreen Rubio
03-13-00698-CV
Tex. App.Aug 26, 2015Background
- Doreen Rubio (appellant) claimed Joan Walsh Breheny conveyed a house to her by parol sale (or alternatively parol gift), alleging she paid over $110,000 on the mortgage, possessed the property since 1993, and made permanent improvements.
- The trial court ruled against Doreen and imposed sanctions; Doreen appeals and seeks rehearing, arguing errors in legal rulings and sanctions procedure.
- Appellant contends her First Amended Petition fairly pleaded a parol sale under Texas’s "fair notice" pleading standard and that no special exceptions were filed challenging the pleading.
- Appellant argues the trial court incorrectly required a writing, misapplied statute-of-frauds principles, and failed to consider parol-sale (and parol-gift) evidence of payment, possession, and improvements (partial performance doctrine).
- Appellant further argues the appellate opinion declined to analyze factual sufficiency of the evidence and improperly upheld sanctions based on the trial court’s supposed inherent authority without notice or a hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether parol sale was adequately pleaded | Rubio: Petition alleges parol sale by alleging she paid mortgage/taxes and improved property; fair-notice pleading suffices | Walsh: Court concluded parol sale not pleaded (per appellate opinion) | Appellant urges rehearing — argues pleading was sufficient under Texas fair-notice rule and Rule 67 (court did not decide) |
| Whether evidence should be reviewed for factual as well as legal sufficiency | Rubio: Appellate court failed to weigh evidence supporting parol sale/gift; demands factual sufficiency review | Walsh: Appellate opinion stated it weighed evidence and found implied findings not against overwhelming weight | Appellant asserts appellate opinion did not address evidence and seeks reversal or rendition on parol sale/gift theory |
| Whether parol gift is an alternative ground for recovery | Rubio: Same facts support parol gift; consideration not required where possession and improvements exist | Walsh: (implicit) property transfer required writing or no enforceable oral gift | Appellant contends evidence supports a completed parol gift and warrants relief |
| Whether sanctions were validly imposed under trial court’s inherent authority | Rubio: Sanctions were imposed without notice/hearing and cannot be upheld on inherent authority alone; motion on file addressed discovery only | Walsh: Appellate opinion sustained sanctions based on inherent power | Appellant argues due-process violation and urges reversal of sanctions order |
Key Cases Cited
- Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. 2000) (describing Texas fair-notice pleading standard)
- Hooks v. Bridgewater, 229 S.W. 1114 (Tex. 1921) (establishing parol sale/partial performance elements: payment, possession, and improvements)
- Boyert v. Tauber, 834 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. 1992) (partial performance as corroboration of oral real-estate agreement)
- In re Bennett, 960 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1997) (discussing trial-court inherent authority to sanction and due-process limits)
- Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2004) (standard of review for trial-court sanctions and abuse-of-discretion review)