506 F.Supp.3d 142
D. Mass.2020Background:
- Petitioner Ritch Dorce is an ICE civil detainee who was transferred from Plymouth County Correctional Facility (Mass.) to Etowah County Detention Center (Alabama) on June 9–10, 2020, during the COVID-19 national emergency.
- The transfer involved at least four stops, air travel with commingling of detainees, an overnight stay at the LaSalle ICE Processing Center, and an eight-hour van ride with allegedly unsanitary conditions and tightly shackled detainees.
- Dorce alleges he had no realistic opportunity to socially distance or disinfect and that the transfer materially increased his risk of COVID-19 exposure; ICE guidance acknowledged that transfers increase COVID risk.
- Dorce sued for declaratory and injunctive relief asking to be returned to Massachusetts; he moved for a preliminary injunction to reverse the transfer.
- Defendants argued the court lacked jurisdiction under INA §1252 to review immigration-related decisions; the court addressed that jurisdictional defense and the merits of the preliminary-injunction factors.
- The court held §1252(a)(2)(B) does not bar collateral substantive due-process challenges to transfer conditions, found Dorce likely to succeed on the merits (objective unreasonableness/excessive risk), found irreparable harm and that the public interest favors relief, and ordered the parties to confer on resolution.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether INA §1252 bars court review of Dorce's claims | Dorce: claim is a collateral substantive due-process challenge to transfer conditions, not a challenge to removal discretion | Govt: §1252 strips courts of jurisdiction over immigration-related claims by noncitizens | Court: §1252(a)(2)(B) does not bar review of independent substantive due-process claims (Aguilar/Jennings distinction) |
| Whether defendants' transfer decision was objectively unreasonable under substantive due process | Dorce: transfer amid COVID, multiple stops, commingling, and unsanitary transport created an excessive, intolerable risk | Govt: ICE has broad discretion to transfer detainees for administrative reasons | Court: Likely to succeed — facts show transfer posed an excessive COVID-19 risk in violation of due process standards |
| Whether preliminary injunction factors are satisfied (irreparable harm, balance of hardships, public interest) | Dorce: constitutional rights deprivation and substantial health risk constitute irreparable harm; public interest favors preventing constitutional violations | Govt: (implicit) enforcement and custody interests weigh against injunctive relief | Court: Irreparable harm shown; balance/public interest favor injunctive relief when constitutional rights at stake |
| Scope of relief (return to Massachusetts) | Dorce: seeks return to PCCF / injunctive relief to reverse transfer | Govt: authority to determine detainee placement and logistics | Court: Entitled to relief; ordered parties to confer and propose resolution (court retained ability to hold hearing) |
Key Cases Cited
- Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010) (Secretary has discretion over many removal-related substantive decisions)
- Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf't Div. of Dep't of Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007) (§1252 does not bar independent substantive due-process challenges)
- Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (distinguishing challenges to detention fact from conditions-based ancillary challenges)
- Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (standard for evaluating constitutionality of detention conditions)
- Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015) (objective unreasonableness standard in detention contexts)
- Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993) (Eighth Amendment standard for exposure to serious health risk)
- Nieves-Márquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108 (1st Cir. 2003) (preliminary injunction factor framework)
- Banks v. Booth, 459 F. Supp. 143 (D.D.C. 2020) (finding transfer amid COVID-19 can violate detainee rights)
- C.G.B. v. Wolf, 464 F. Supp. 3d 174 (D.D.C. 2020) (constitutional rights deprivation as irreparable harm in COVID-era detainee cases)
- Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (deprivation of constitutional rights constitutes irreparable injury)
- Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2012) (public interest favors preventing constitutional violations)
- Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (equities and public-interest factors merge when government is opposing preliminary relief)