Donriel A. Borne v. Celadon Trucking Services, Inc., 532 S.W.3d 274

Background

July 1, 2009 three‑vehicle rear-end crash: plaintiff Borne (Trimac driver) was rear‑ended by Celadon truck; Celadon was immediately struck by Chickasaw truck. Borne sued Celadon (and others later dismissed).
Borne treated for back/neck pain; conflicting medical testimony on causation, permanency, and work capacity; subsequent April 2011 fender‑bender and a June 2009 prior collision were in the record and contested as potential causes or contributors.
Pretrial: Borne entered an agreement with Chickasaw limiting Chickasaw’s exposure (half any judgment); Chickasaw was later dismissed; Celadon raised the agreement at trial but it was not admitted into evidence.
Jury awarded $3,705,000 across four damage categories (lost earning capacity, pain/suffering, permanent injury, loss of enjoyment). Trial court denied a new trial but suggested remittitur reducing each category (total ~$2,100,000), and Borne accepted under protest.
Court of Appeals affirmed most rulings, reinstated the jury award for lost earning capacity, and suggested further remittitur on loss of enjoyment of life to $50,000. Tennessee Supreme Court granted review.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Validity/admission/effect of pretrial agreement with Chickasaw	Borne: agreement was permissible and any objection waived; limited disclosure at trial was allowed	Celadon: agreement was a Mary Carter–type device that subverted jury trial, should have been invalidated/ admitted/used for impeachment or to strike panel	Court: Celadon waived public‑policy challenge by not raising it at trial; trial court did not abuse discretion in declining to admit exhibit after close of proof; no showing of collusion in peremptory strikes; affirmed trial court rulings.
Jury instruction on superseding (intervening) cause based on April 2011 accident	Borne: general causation and proximate‑cause instructions were sufficient; superseding cause not supported	Celadon: material evidence supported a superseding‑cause instruction; it was entitled to the special instruction	Court: material evidence existed to support an instruction, but the court properly denied the special instruction because the jury charge as a whole adequately covered causation; no reversible error.
Appellate authority to further remit after trial court suggests remittitur	Borne: appellate further remittitur improper unless remitted award exceeds upper boundary of reasonableness (material evidence standard)	Celadon: appellate courts may apply preponderance standard and suggest further remittitur if they find it warranted	Court: Court of Appeals exceeded authority in further remitting loss‑of‑enjoyment award because it did not find the trial court’s remitted amount lacked material evidence support; reversed that further remittitur.
Trial court’s suggested remittitur (adequacy of reasons / standard of review)	Borne: trial court need not supply detailed reasons	Celadon: trial court’s remittitur appropriate	Court: remittitur review uses Long v. Mattingly three‑part approach; because the trial court gave no factual reasons for its reductions and the evidence on damages was sharply conflicting, remand required for trial judge to explain basis for suggested remittitur so appellate review under the preponderance standard can occur.

Key Cases Cited

Serv‑U‑Mart, Inc. v. Sullivan Cnty., 527 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn. 1975) (issues not raised at trial cannot be raised first in motion for new trial)
Foster v. Amcon Int’l, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 142 (Tenn. 1981) (trial judge as thirteenth juror; remittitur/additur principles)
Ellis v. White Freightliner Corp., 603 S.W.2d 125 (Tenn. 1980) (appellate deference when trial judge approves verdict; material‑evidence inquiry)
Coffey v. Fayette Tubular Prods., 929 S.W.2d 326 (Tenn. 1996) (appellate authority to suggest remittitur exists but is more circumscribed than trial court’s; review standard explanation)
Meals ex rel. Meals v. Ford Motor Co., 417 S.W.3d 414 (Tenn. 2013) (explains that when trial judge approves verdict, appellate suggestion of remittitur is limited to material‑evidence standard)
Davidson v. Lindsey, 104 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. 2003) (no verdict is valid until approved by trial judge; thirteenth juror role explained)
White v. Premier Med. Group, 254 S.W.3d 411 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (material‑evidence standard for submitting jury instruction issues)
Godbee v. Dimick, 213 S.W.3d 865 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (distinguishes causation‑in‑fact disputes from superseding‑cause instructions)