620 F. App'x 425
6th Cir.2015Background
- On June 27, 2012 Memphis officers (Archie, Hendree, Bridgeforth) pursued Hernandez Dowdy after locating a vehicle still listed as carjacked in NCIC (an earlier officer had determined the report false but failed to update the database).
- Officers activated lights; Dowdy drove away at high speed, ran a stop sign and crashed head-on into another car; he exited and fled on foot with one hand held in front at his waist.
- Officers chased on foot, ordered Dowdy to stop; Hendree warned he would shoot. Archie testified Dowdy looked back repeatedly as if to locate officers and stopped at an intersection as if to turn.
- Archie fired one shot, striking Dowdy in the back; Dowdy died. Department initially found the shooting justified but later discharged Archie for violating deadly-force policy; Nolen (the dispatcher/officer who failed to update NCIC) was suspended.
- Dowdy’s heirs sued Archie (excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and the City (Monell failure to train/supervise and state-law negligence/wrongful death). The district court granted summary judgment for defendants; plaintiffs appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Archie used excessive (deadly) force in shooting Dowdy | Archie’s shooting was unreasonable; nondeadly alternatives existed; Dowdy did not pose a threat merely from crashing his car | Archie reasonably (objectively) believed Dowdy was armed and dangerous based on carjacking report, Dowdy’s hand position, and evasive behavior | Court: Qualified immunity — use of deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances; summary judgment for Archie upheld |
| Whether a clearly established right was violated to defeat qualified immunity | Plaintiffs invoked Garner to show established law prohibits such shootings | Defendants argued Garner is distinguishable; here probable cause to believe a violent crime (carjacking) and facts supporting belief Dowdy was armed | Court: No clearly established violation; Garner distinguishes burglary facts from this case; qualified immunity applies |
| Whether City is liable under Monell for failure to train/supervise/discipline | City’s policies/training/supervision were deficient and caused constitutional injury | Monell liability cannot stand absent an underlying constitutional violation; no evidence of municipal deliberate indifference | Court: Monell claims fail because no underlying constitutional violation survived summary judgment |
| Whether Tennessee law waives municipal immunity for negligence/wrongful death claims | Nolen’s failure to update NCIC and City’s training/supervision are ordinary negligence actionable under TGTLA | City argued discretionary-function and civil-rights exceptions preserve immunity (training/supervision = discretionary; negligence tied to civil-rights claim) | Court: City immune. Discretionary-function exception bars direct-negligence claims; civil-rights exception bars vicarious negligence tied to the §1983 circumstances |
Key Cases Cited
- Flagg v. City of Detroit, 715 F.3d 165 (6th Cir. 2013) (standard for reviewing summary judgment in §1983 excessive-force suits)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective-reasonableness standard for use of force)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force against fleeing suspect limited to situations involving threat or serious harm)
- Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police Dep’t, 389 F.3d 167 (6th Cir. 2004) (qualified immunity where officer made objectively reasonable mistake about threat)
- Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 187 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 1999) (expert’s conclusory opinion cannot create genuine factual dispute)
- Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901 (6th Cir. 2009) (plaintiff’s burden to overcome qualified immunity)
- Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 2014) (Monell liability requires an underlying constitutional violation)
- Giggers v. Memphis Hous. Auth., 363 S.W.3d 500 (Tenn. 2012) (discretionary-function vs. operational distinction under Tennessee law)