DONNA PLATT VS. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM(PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM), A-0516-15T4

Donna Platt, a long‑time PERS participant, served as part‑time municipal prosecutor in five municipalities; the Division investigated her PERS eligibility after Chapter 92 (2007) pension reforms.
Chapter 92 (N.J.S.A. 43:15A‑7.2) bars PERS membership or accrual of credit for persons performing professional services under a "professional services contract" (LPCL § 40A:11‑5) or those meeting the IRS independent contractor test, effective for contracts entered after the statute's effective date.
The Division concluded Platt's Berlin Township work was employment eligible for PERS, but her services in Winslow, Hi‑Nella, Chesilhurst, and Berlin Borough were provided under professional services contracts and thus ineligible after Jan 1, 2008.
An ALJ held Platt’s appointments in the four municipalities were engagements under professional services contracts; the Board adopted the ALJ decision (after a limited remand correcting a date error) and denied Platt continued PERS credit for those services.
Platt appealed, asserting (1) Chapter 92 unconstitutionally impairs her contractual rights (Contracts Clause) and (2) her prosecutor roles were bona fide employment (IRS employee factors), not professional services contracts.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Chapter 92 (N.J.S.A. 43:15A‑7.2) unconstitutionally impairs Platt's contractual rights	Platt: statute retroactively and substantially impairs her vested expectation in PERS benefits she relied on when accepting lower pay	State: pension eligibility is statutory, not a contract right; Chapter 92 preserved in‑force contracts and served an important public purpose (pension integrity and cost control)	Held: No unconstitutional impairment; Chapter 92 is a lawful legislative reform and did not unlawfully impair contracts
Whether Platt's municipal prosecutor engagements were "professional services contracts" (disqualifying) or bona fide employment	Platt: services were performed as an employee (IRS 20‑factor test) and some municipalities used employment labels or payroll	State/Board: substance over form; municipalities used LPCL procedures (RFPs, resolutions referencing LPCL), some appointments listed Platt’s firm, and record shows professional services contracts under N.J.S.A. 40A:11‑5	Held: The ALJ/Board findings are supported by the record — Platt’s services in the four municipalities were provided pursuant to professional services contracts and she is ineligible for PERS credit after Jan 1, 2008

Uricoli v. Bd. of Trs., 91 N.J. 62 (1982) (describes pension benefits as deferred compensation encouraging public service)
Masse v. Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys., 87 N.J. 252 (1981) (pension statutes as public employment benefits)
DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 (2005) (statutory interpretation principles; legislative intent and ordinary meaning)
IE Test, LLC v. Carroll, 226 N.J. 166 (2016) (statutory language and meaning guidance)
Brick Twp. PBA Local 230 v. Twp. of Brick, 446 N.J. Super. 61 (App. Div. 2016) (appellate review of agency statutory interpretation)
Prado v. State, 186 N.J. 413 (2006) (deference to agency factual findings; arbitrary and capricious standard)
In re Tax Credit Application of Pennrose Props. Inc., 346 N.J. Super. 479 (App. Div. 2001) (burden on party challenging agency decision)
Burgos v. State, 222 N.J. 175 (2015) (Contracts Clause framework and review)
Berg v. Bd. of Trs., 225 N.J. 245 (2016) (three‑part Contracts Clause analysis)
Spina v. Consolidated Police & Firemen's Pension Fund Comm., 41 N.J. 391 (1964) (pension provisions not necessarily contractual rights)
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451 (1985) (statutes do not create private contract rights absent clear intent)