Donna M. Sutherland v. Commissioner, 155 T.C. 95

In 2011 petitioner Donna Sutherland signed joint 2005–2006 returns for her husband shortly before his sentencing after he pleaded guilty to tax crimes; she asserts she had no independent filing obligation and signed under emotional pressure.
Petitioner filed Form 8857 (requesting innocent spouse relief) on September 1, 2016; the IRS Appeals Office issued a preliminary denial, she appealed, then declined to submit more evidence to Appeals because her representative expected a de novo review in Tax Court.
The Appeals Office issued a final determination denying relief on November 15, 2017; petitioner timely filed a Tax Court petition on February 20, 2018.
Congress enacted the Taxpayer First Act, effective July 1, 2019, adding I.R.C. §6015(e)(7), which limits Tax Court review in stand-alone innocent spouse cases to the administrative record plus newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence.
Petitioner moved to remand (filed November 11, 2019) seeking to supplement the administrative record with evidence (e.g., regarding her mental state when she signed the returns), arguing she would have developed the administrative record differently had §6015(e)(7) governed her case.
The Tax Court held §6015(e)(7) does not apply because petitioner’s Tax Court petition was filed before July 1, 2019, and denied the remand as unnecessary because de novo review remains the governing standard in her case.

Issue	Sutherland's Argument	Commissioner’s Argument	Held
Whether §6015(e)(7)’s limited-scope review applies when the Tax Court petition was pending on July 1, 2019	§6015(e)(7) should apply because the case was pending in Court on the effective date, so Tax Court review should be limited to the administrative record	The statutory effective-date text should be read so that §6015(e)(7) applies only to petitions filed in Tax Court on or after July 1, 2019 (and §6015(f)(2) to IRS requests pending on or after that date)	Court held §6015(e)(7) does not apply because petitioner’s petition was filed before July 1, 2019; the phrase “filed or pending” is best read as “petitions filed” and “requests pending.”
Whether the case should be remanded to the IRS Appeals Office to allow supplementation of the administrative record	Remand should be ordered so petitioner can add evidence (mental/physical health, etc.) that she would have submitted if she had known the administrative‑record limitation would apply	Remand is improper in stand‑alone innocent spouse cases and unnecessary here because de novo review applies	Court denied remand as purposeless because de novo review applies (petitioner may present evidence at trial); it did not revisit Friday precedent as applied to cases governed by the amendment.

Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203 (2009) (established de novo review for stand‑alone innocent spouse claims)
Friday v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 220 (2005) (Tax Court declined to remand stand‑alone innocent spouse cases)
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001) (interpretive canon: give effect to each clause and word of a statute)
United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955) (statutory interpretation principle endorsing effect to every clause)
Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004) (use of precise statutory language in effective‑date contexts)
Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993) (textual interpretation and statutory construction)
Klein v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. 341 (2017) (applying canon against surplusage in interpreting Tax Code provisions)