639 S.W.3d 29
Tenn.2022Background
- In Sept. 2014 Donna Cooper met with Dr. Mason Mandy and NuBody staff; Mandy and an employee represented he was a board‑certified plastic surgeon though he was not.
- Cooper consented to a breast‑reduction procedure (performed Oct. 2014) and later alleged the surgery was unnecessarily painful, performed in unsterile/barbaric fashion, and caused disfigurement and bacterial infections.
- In Apr. 2018 the Coopers sued for intentional misrepresentation, medical battery (consent vitiated by misrepresentations), civil conspiracy, and loss of consortium.
- Defendants moved to dismiss for noncompliance with the Health Care Liability Act (HCLA) pre‑suit notice and certificate requirements. Plaintiffs conceded noncompliance but argued the HCLA did not cover their claims because the misrepresentations preceded care and some claims required no expert.
- Trial court and Court of Appeals held the HCLA did not apply (relying on a temporal/business‑practice distinction). The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding the HCLA applies because the claims allege injuries related to provision of health care services and informed consent is part of those services.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the HCLA governs claims based on pre‑surgical misrepresentations that led to surgery | Cooper: misrepresentations were commercial/sales talk made before a doctor‑patient relationship; claims (medical battery, intentional misrep.) fall outside HCLA; expert testimony not required | Mandy/NuBody: claims allege injuries from a surgical procedure and thus are "related to the provision of health care services"; HCLA applies regardless of theory | HCLA applies: the Act covers any civil action alleging a health care provider caused injury related to provision of health care services, regardless of theory; informed consent is part of health care services |
Key Cases Cited
- Ellithorpe v. Weismark, 479 S.W.3d 818 (Tenn. 2015) (HCLA definition of "health care liability action" broadly applies regardless of theory)
- Estate of French v. Stratford House, 333 S.W.3d 546 (Tenn. 2011) (pre‑Civil Justice Act test distinguishing ordinary negligence from medical malpractice)
- Franks v. Sykes, 600 S.W.3d 908 (Tenn. 2020) (Consumer Protection Act claims for business practices not implicating injuries from medical care are not HCLA claims)
- White v. Beeks, 469 S.W.3d 517 (Tenn. 2015) (medical battery may be independent of negligence but can still be governed by HCLA when related to health care services)
- Miller ex rel. Miller v. Dacus, 231 S.W.3d 903 (Tenn. 2007) (informed consent duties described as part of health care; statute referenced)
- Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn. 1998) (informed consent elements and battery analysis)
- Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Hickman Cmty. Health Care Servs., Inc., 418 S.W.3d 547 (Tenn. 2013) (statutory changes and interpretation context for HCLA)