862 N.W.2d 122
S.D.2015Background
- Donat and Johnson were previously part of the same social circle; relationship deteriorated after incidents from 2011–2012 (insults, a shove with a cake, an unwanted sexual advance).
- Johnson purchased property in the same subdivision and frequently used a paved road that runs in front of Donat’s home (also plowed/sanded under contract).
- From late 2013 to April 2014 Donat observed repeated drive-bys, slow stops in front of her house, glaring, and other confrontational encounters; neighbors corroborated vehicle conduct.
- April 21, 2014: Johnson stopped near Donat while she gardened, exited his vehicle briefly, then left; Donat filed for and obtained an ex parte temporary protection order.
- After a day-long hearing the circuit court entered findings and granted a permanent protection order; Johnson appealed raising six claims.
Issues
| Issue | Donat's Argument | Johnson's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether circuit court findings were clearly erroneous | Court credited Donat’s testimony and factual findings supported by witnesses | Court misfound certain dates and misattributed drive-bys to Johnson | Findings not clearly erroneous; credibility determinations upheld |
| Whether issuance of protection order was an abuse of discretion | Conduct constituted willful, malicious, repeated harassment (stalking) under SDCL 22-19A | Conduct lacked requisite statutory stalking elements and legitimate purpose existed | No abuse of discretion; statutory elements satisfied when read as whole |
| Whether Johnson’s due process rights were violated by lack of notice | Petition and affidavit gave specific facts; discovery responses identified witnesses | Evidence at hearing included matters allegedly beyond petition scope | No due process violation; pleadings plus discovery provided adequate notice |
| Whether prior-relationship and criminal-record evidence was inadmissible "other acts" | Prior incidents were part of the course-of-conduct and relevant to motive/intent/remedy | Prior events were collateral "other acts" and prejudicial | Admission appropriate: history formed course-of-conduct; impeachment evidence largely permissible; no prejudicial error |
| Whether SDCL 22-19A-1 is unconstitutionally vague as applied | Statute and facts provided sufficient notice in context of their relationship | Statute lacks an objective reasonable-person standard; risks arbitrary enforcement | Statute not void as applied here; Johnson’s conduct gave fair notice it was forbidden |
| Whether restricting use of the paved road (stay 100 feet) was an abuse of discretion | Restriction necessary given many incidents occurred on that road | Order unduly burdens Johnson’s access to home, contract duties, and family events | Remedy within court’s broad equitable discretion; not an abuse |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Akuba, 686 N.W.2d 406 (S.D. 2004) (appellate review defers to trial court factual findings unless clearly erroneous)
- White v. Bain, 752 N.W.2d 203 (S.D. 2008) (standard for reviewing protection orders mirrors injunction review; two-step clear error/abuse of discretion)
- Goeden v. Daum, 668 N.W.2d 108 (S.D. 2003) (trial courts must enter clear findings in stalking cases; cannot merely check a box)
- Asmussen, 668 N.W.2d 725 (S.D. 2003) (void-for-vagueness analysis of stalking statute; challenge assessed as applied)
- Boe, 847 N.W.2d 315 (S.D. 2014) (party challenging admission of "other acts" evidence bears burden to show abuse of discretion and prejudice)