570 F. App'x 443
6th Cir.2014Background
- Donald Wallace was convicted after witnesses saw a struggle in his car, a shotgun blast, and later found Melinda Perrin fatally shot; Wallace turned himself in and initially convicted of first-degree murder, later reduced to second-degree murder on appeal.
- Wallace’s trial counsel pursued a defense that Perrin accidentally shot herself (teasing with the gun); counsel did not call a witness about the gun’s alleged "hair trigger," nor request jury instructions on accident or self-defense.
- Prosecutor’s closing argument repeatedly denigrated the defense (calling it "a bunch of bull," a "smoking gun case," and a "prosecutor’s dream"); counsel did not object at trial.
- On resentencing, the judge relied on a presentence report (PSR) that Wallace contends misstated prior convictions and probation status; counsel did not object to the court’s factual findings at sentencing.
- In state post-conviction proceedings, Wallace raised ineffective-assistance claims; his appointed appellate counsel omitted several claims from the brief, but appended Wallace’s pro se supplemental brief—Tennessee courts appear not to have considered the pro se claims, and the appellate court denied the claims raised by counsel on the merits.
- Wallace filed federal habeas claims; Sixth Circuit granted COA on four ineffective-assistance issues and affirmed denial of habeas relief, holding most claims procedurally defaulted and the preserved improper-remarks claim denied under AEDPA/Strickland review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Defense-theory failures: counsel failed to investigate/call witness about a "hair trigger" and failed to request accident/self-defense jury instructions | Wallace: Counsel unreasonably rejected his preferred accident theory and failed to present supporting evidence/instructions, prejudicing the defense | State: Claims were not properly presented on post-conviction appeal; merits aside, appellate procedure barred review | Held: Procedurally defaulted — Tennessee rule barring pro se briefs by represented parties prevented fair presentation; post-conviction appellate counsel’s omission does not excuse default under Martinez/Trevino framework |
| Procedural-default challenge to pro se supplemental brief | Wallace: His pro se appendix (filed with counsel’s brief) fairly presented omitted claims to state court | State: Tennessee rule regularly enforces that represented litigants cannot file pro se briefs; court treated claims as unpresented | Held: Court found Tennessee rule adequate and independent; Wallace’s supplemental brief did not fairly present the claims, so they are defaulted |
| Sentencing/PSR errors: counsel failed to correct PSR inaccuracies used for enhancements | Wallace: Inaccurate PSR inflated prior offenses and probation status, counsel failed to object, prejudicing sentencing | State: Claim was presented to post-conviction trial court but not pursued on appeal; post-conviction court denied relief for lack of proof at evidentiary hearing | Held: Procedurally defaulted on appeal; ineffective assistance of post-conviction appellate counsel is not cause, and ineffective assistance at post-conviction trial stage does not excuse appellate default |
| Failure to object to prosecutor’s improper closing remarks | Wallace: Counsel’s failure to object to denigrating statements (e.g., calling defense "a bunch of bull") was deficient and prejudiced the jury | State: Even if remarks were improper, the evidence (eyewitnesses, medical examiner, flight/concealment) was strong; no reasonable probability of a different outcome | Held: Claim adjudicated on the merits by Tennessee court; under AEDPA and Strickland the denial was not an unreasonable application of federal law — Wallace not entitled to relief (prejudice prong upheld) |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (procedural default and counsel error on post-conviction generally not cause)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (narrow exception allowing cause for default when initial-review collateral counsel is ineffective)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013) (extends Martinez where state procedural structure makes direct presentation virtually impossible)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (AEDPA deference standards for "contrary to" or "unreasonable application")
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (standard for unreasonable application under AEDPA; deference to state-court rulings)
- United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) (prosecutorial statements of personal opinion can be improper)
- Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986) (framework for procedural default analysis)