Donald Stacy v. Carolyn Colvin, 825 F.3d 563

Background

Stacy applied for Social Security benefits claiming disability beginning June 30, 1994; prior work was 17 years as a stationary engineer supervising boiler operations at a state penitentiary.
Administrative denials led to multiple hearings, two district-court remands, and three ALJ hearings with differing findings about Stacy's past work and RFC.
On the first ALJ hearing a VE testified Stacy performed heavy work as a "working supervisor" and could not perform his past job; ALJ found non-disabled at step 5.
Magistrate Judge Jelderks ordered a broad remand to develop the record, including reevaluation of visual acuity, subjective complaints, work activity, and obtaining additional expert evidence.
District Judge Mosman later remanded again for a correct RFC and further step-5 evaluation after finding errors in the ALJ's RFC and VE/DOT consistency.
On the third remand hearing a new VE testified Stacy could perform the job of "stationary engineer supervisor" as generally performed (supervisory duties ~70–75% of his time); the ALJ denied benefits at step 4 and the district court affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether law of the case bars ALJ from reexamining ability to perform past work on remand	Stacy: ALJ was bound by earlier ALJ findings that he could not perform past work	Commissioner: Law of the case applies but new evidence on remand permits reconsideration	Court: Law of the case applies in SSAs but need not be applied where new, highly probative evidence appears; no abuse of discretion in reconsidering step 4
Whether the rule of mandate prohibited ALJ from revisiting step 4 on remand	Stacy: Mandate focusing on step 5 forbade recharacterization of past work	Commissioner: Mandate/order allowed any action consistent with correcting RFC and developing record	Court: Traditional rule of mandate applies in Social Security cases; remand orders here were broad and permitted reevaluation, so no mandate violation
Whether ALJ erred by classifying past work by its least demanding function (supervision)	Stacy: ALJ improperly picked the least demanding task (supervising) despite his working-supervisor duties that included manual labor	Commissioner: Job as classified in the DOT is supervisory and Stacy actually performed supervision most of the time	Court: No error — where the DOT defines the job as supervisory and claimant performed supervision 70–75% of time, applying the "generally performed" test was proper and not using the least-demanding function
Whether substantial evidence supports ALJ's step 4 finding that Stacy can perform past work as generally performed	Stacy: Prior VE testimony and state-specific evidence show supervisory jobs often require manual work, undermining the step 4 finding	Commissioner: VE on remand and DOT support that the job is generally supervisory in the national economy	Court: Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that Stacy can perform his past work as generally performed nationally

Key Cases Cited

Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2012) (law of the case standard and discretionary application)
Merritt v. Mackey, 932 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1991) (exceptions to law of the case: new evidence, changed law, injustice)
United States v. Cote, 51 F.3d 178 (9th Cir. 1995) (rule of mandate explanation)
Odima v. Westin Tucson Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (issues not disposed on appeal may be reconsidered on remand)
Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877 (U.S. 1989) (standard of review for compliance with remand orders)
Carmickle v. Comm'r, SSA, 533 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2008) (error where ALJ treated an occasional task as the claimant's primary job)
Valencia v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1985) (ALJ erred by equating least demanding task with full-time past work)
Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2001) (error where ALJ classified past work by a minor task rather than the primary job)