357 S.W.3d 845
Tex. App.2012Background
- Jury convicted Schnidt of aggravated robbery; sentence 16 years plus $5,000 fine.
- Defendants allegedly participated with Green and Trabant in robbing Edwin Burger of cocaine; Burger died later of natural causes.
- Trabant and Chavez testified for State; Green admitted guilt to aggravated robbery; Green testified appellant acted as an accomplice or principal.
- Clerks identified suspicious use of Burger’s credit card; police arrested Schnidt, Green, and Trabant after a felony stop.
- Detective Beltran recorded a post-arrest statement from Schnidt, in which he admitted using Burger’s credit card; motion to suppress challenged this statement.
- Trial court overruled suppression motion; jury charged on law of parties; verdict affirmed on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legal sufficiency of the evidence | Schnidt challenges evidence; corroboration required for accomplice-witness and jailhouse informant. | Evidence insufficient to connect Schnidt to offense beyond accomplice testimony and jailhouse informant; lack of physical evidence. | Sufficiency upheld; corroboration established; rational jury could find guilt. |
| Evidence corroboration under accomplice-witness rule | Remains uncorroborated apart from accomplice testimony and jailhouse informant. | Corroboration required beyond mere offense admission; insufficient. | Corroboration exists via post-offense conduct and property use; sufficient to connect Schnidt. |
| Motion to suppress recorded statement | Statement obtained after arrest; probable cause and voluntariness contested. | Coercion or intoxication could render statement involuntary. | No reversible error; probable cause and voluntariness supported; suppression denied. |
| Charge on the law of parties | Law of parties instruction appropriate if evidence supports party liability. | Instruction unnecessary where principal actor proven; potential error harmless. | Harmless error; evidence supports Schnidt as principal actor. |
Key Cases Cited
- Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (no meaningful distinction between legal and factual sufficiency post-Brooks)
- Smith v. State, 332 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (standard for accomplice-witness corroboration)
- Cathey v. State, 992 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (tendency-to-connect standard for corroboration)
- Richardson v. State, 879 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (corroboration may rely on additional circumstances)
- Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (multiplicity of theories; evidence sufficiency for one theory suffices)
- Lujan v. State, 331 S.W.3d 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (standard for reviewing suppression rulings (fact-finding deference))
- Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (two-step abuse-of-discretion review for suppression)
- Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (voluntariness standard for confessions)