DONALD ROTUNDA v. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., 123 A.3d 980

Rotunda sued Marriott under the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA) alleging deceptive currency-quote practices at Marriott Russian hotels and sought damages personally and "on behalf of the general public."
Rotunda expressly declined to seek class certification under Superior Court Rule 23; the trial court dismissed the representative portion of the suit for that reason.
After dismissal, Rotunda settled his individual claim but preserved the right to appeal the dismissal of the representative claim; the appellate court addressed mootness/standing concerns but exercised discretion to decide the appeal.
Central legal question: whether the 2000 CPPA amendments that permit representative suits on behalf of "the general public" manifest a clear legislative intent to displace Rule 23 procedures (notice, opt-out, manageability) for class-like damage claims.
The court emphasized due-process and case-management concerns (notice to absent members, opt-out vs opt-in regimes, manageability when individual issues predominate), and found the CPPA amendments silent and not an unambiguous repeal of Rule 23.
Judgment affirmed: representative CPPA damage suits remain subject to Rule 23 unless Council's intent to the contrary is explicit.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Applicability of Rule 23 to CPPA representative damage actions	Rotunda: CPPA's silence on procedure allows courts "equitable discretion" to manage representative suits without Rule 23; representative suit authorized by statute suffices.	Marriott (and District): The 2000 amendments did not repeal Rule 23; Rule 23's notice, opt-out, and manageability safeguards apply to protect due process.	Held: No clear legislative intent to displace Rule 23; representative CPPA damage suits must satisfy Rule 23 procedures.
Mootness/standing after plaintiff settled individual claim	Rotunda: Settlement reserved right to appeal dismissal of representative claim; appeal should proceed.	Marriott: Settlement of individual claim moots plaintiff's interest and deprives appellate standing.	Held: Court exercised prudential discretion to decide the merits despite settlement because issue has broad public importance and the record presents concrete adversarial argument.

Grayson v. AT&T Corp., 15 A.3d 219 (D.C. 2011) (analyzing whether CPPA amendments eliminated the court's standing requirement and requiring clear legislative intent to alter court practices)
Ford v. ChartOne, Inc., 908 A.2d 72 (D.C. 2006) (CPPA class-action analysis and application of Rule 23 standards in CPPA suits)
General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (U.S. 1982) (standard for class certification and consideration of economy/manageability)
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (U.S. 2000) (mootness exceptions and prudential considerations for deciding cases at advanced stages)
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (U.S. 1975) (standing and the importance of judicial self-governance considerations)
Mallof v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 1 A.3d 383 (D.C. 2010) (mootness and exceptions allowing adjudication despite changes in parties' interests)
Atchison v. District of Columbia, 585 A.2d 150 (D.C. 1991) (District of Columbia court's discretionary approach to mootness based on issues' public significance)
United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (U.S. 1989) (warning against inferring legislative intent from subsequent amendments or poste enactment views)