44 N.E.3d 42
Ind. Ct. App.2015Background
- Donald Richardson worked as a marshal for the Town of Worthington police department; the department had fewer than five law-enforcement employees while he worked there.
- Richardson sued Worthington under Indiana’s Minimum Wage Law (MWL), seeking overtime pay, penalties, and fees.
- Worthington moved for summary judgment arguing the MWL does not apply because Worthington is subject to the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) minimum wage provisions and the MWL excludes employers covered by those provisions.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Worthington, concluding Worthington was covered by the FLSA minimum wage provisions and thus excluded from the MWL.
- Richardson appealed, arguing the MWL exemption refers to both the FLSA’s minimum wage (section 206) and maximum hours/overtime (section 207) provisions, and because Worthington was exempt from the FLSA overtime rule it remained subject to the MWL.
- The Court of Appeals considered statutory text and structure, FLSA distinctions between “minimum wage” and “maximum hours,” and prior legislative history to determine legislative intent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the MWL’s exemption for employers “subject to the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA” excludes an employer that is subject to FLSA minimum wage but exempt from FLSA overtime | Richardson: “minimum wage provisions” was intended to include both FLSA §206 (min wage) and §207 (overtime), so Worthington is not excluded | Worthington: phrase refers only to FLSA minimum wage provisions (§206); being subject to §206 is sufficient to exempt an employer from the MWL | Held: MWL’s reference means FLSA section 206 only; Worthington is subject to FLSA minimum wage provisions and thus excluded from the MWL; summary judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Peoples State Bank v. Benton Twp. of Monroe Cnty., 28 N.E.3d 317 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (summary-judgment standard and statutory interpretation principles)
- Van Kirk v. Miller, 869 N.E.2d 534 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (presumption of validity for trial court’s summary-judgment order)
- Fort Wayne Patrolman’s Benevolent Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 903 N.E.2d 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (use of dictionary to supply ordinary meaning of undefined statutory term)
- Dep’t of Fin. Insts. v. Massey, 20 N.E.3d 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (statutory-construction principles; look to express statutory language to ascertain legislative intent)