Donald R. Rice v. Beverly Crossley, 17-0089

Donald Rice and Beverly Crossley became engaged in spring 2014; Rice purchased engagement/wedding rings and gave them to Crossley.
Crossley ended the engagement in August 2014 and offered to return the rings; Rice told her to keep them hoping she would reconsider and did not accept the rings.
Crossley later consigned the rings to a jeweler and received $5,300 (less than purchase price). She gave the money briefly to Rice’s son, who later returned it to Crossley; Crossley again offered to return the funds to Rice, who refused.
Rice sued Crossley (including a breach of contract claim); Crossley counterclaimed but agreed to withdraw the counterclaim if summary judgment was granted.
The circuit court granted Crossley’s motion for summary judgment, finding Rice twice refused offers to return either the rings or their sale proceeds, evidencing Rice’s intention to frustrate Crossley’s attempts to return them.
Rice appealed, arguing genuine issues of material fact (particularly about the parties’ intent) and misapplication of Bryan v. Lincoln; the Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists about Rice's refusal to accept return of rings or proceeds	Rice: his refusal was to induce Crossley to reconsider the engagement, so intent creates a factual dispute	Crossley: she offered to return rings and proceeds twice and Rice refused; his motive doesn’t create a trialworthy factual dispute	No genuine issue; summary judgment for Crossley affirmed
Whether Rice can rely on Bryan v. Lincoln to recover value given in contemplation of marriage	Rice: Bryan applies to money/gifts given for marriage that was not performed	Crossley: Bryan is distinguishable because she attempted to return rings and proceeds; Bryan involved refusal to return funds	Bryan inapplicable; underlying facts distinguish case; no relief for Rice

Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (W. Va. 1994) (standard of review and summary judgment principles)
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (W. Va. 1963) (summary judgment granted only when no genuine issue of fact exists)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (opposing party must produce more than a scintilla of evidence to survive summary judgment)
Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (W. Va. 1995) (burden-shifting and nonmoving party’s obligations in summary judgment context)
Bryan v. Lincoln, 168 W.Va. 556, 285 S.E.2d 152 (W. Va. 1981) (case involving money given in contemplation of marriage where recipient refused to return funds)
Toth v. Bd. of Parks & Recreation Comm’rs, 215 W.Va. 51, 593 S.E.2d 576 (W. Va. 2003) (summary judgment review standard)
Andrick v. Town of Buckhannon, 187 W.Va. 706, 421 S.E.2d 247 (W. Va. 1992) (quoting Aetna on summary judgment threshold)