29 F.4th 873
7th Cir.2022Background
- In May 2015 A.P. (Karr’s then-girlfriend) reported two assaults by Donald Karr at their home; she sought and received hospital care documenting scalp/jaw/chin injuries and petechiae in the mouth. A.P. later reported Karr forced her to perform oral sex and observed a light from Karr’s phone she believed indicated a video was being taken.
- Karr was tried on domestic battery, two counts of rape, strangulation, and intimidation; convicted of domestic battery and rape, acquitted on strangulation and intimidation; sentenced to 17.5 years (with five years suspended).
- Trial counsel Joshua Taylor excluded inculpatory text messages and obtained a directed verdict on one count; after conviction Karr replaced Taylor with Jane Ruemmele and pursued claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel (IATC).
- Postconviction and direct appeal asserted two main IATC claims (Taylor failed to investigate A.P.’s medication use and failed to present forensic cellphone-audit evidence). State courts rejected them as meritless/no prejudice; Karr’s certiorari petitions were denied.
- In federal habeas proceedings Karr reasserted those two claims and added six additional IATC claims that were not pursued in state court (procedurally defaulted). The district court denied habeas relief; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the state courts reasonably applied Strickland as to the two adjudicated claims, and (2) the six newly raised claims are insubstantial and not saved by the Martinez/Trevino equitable exception.
Issues
| Issue | Karr’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Taylor was ineffective for not investigating/presenting A.P.’s medication/medical records | Failure to investigate hydrocodone use and IV meds undermined A.P.’s memory/credibility | A.P. spoke coherently to police and nurses; records likely unavailable or inadmissible; decision was reasonable strategy and no prejudice | Court: No prejudice; state court reasonably applied Strickland and Taylor’s choice was a reasonable strategic judgment |
| Whether Taylor was ineffective for not presenting forensic cellphone-audit evidence | Audit showed no porn/video on Karr’s phone for the second assault; would have impeached A.P.’s account of a video/light | Audit had limits (deleted content possible); introducing it could be neutralized by State or even backfire; no reasonable probability of a different result | Court: No prejudice; presenting audit unlikely to change outcome; state court’s Strickland application reasonable |
| Whether six defaulted IATC claims are excused by Martinez/Trevino (substantiality requirement) | Martinez/Trevino excuse procedural defaults; the six claims have some merit | The six claims are vague, conclusory, and insubstantial; Martinez exception inapplicable | Court: Claims are not substantial; Martinez/Trevino do not excuse the defaults |
| Whether Martinez/Trevino applies given Ruemmele’s dual/retained role (initial-review vs direct-appeal counsel) | Retention/dual role should not bar Martinez relief; failures should still excuse defaults | Ruemmele mainly served as direct-appeal counsel when defaults occurred; Martinez pertains to failures in initial-review collateral proceedings; retention complicates relief | Court: Court declines to resolve whether retention changes Martinez scope but notes Ruemmele’s direct-appeal role removes this case from classic Martinez terrain; affirms denial on other grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-prong IATC standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (narrow equitable exception allowing cause for default when initial-review collateral counsel was ineffective)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (extends Martinez where state procedure makes direct-appeal Strickland claims virtually impossible)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (general rule barring use of postconviction counsel’s ineffectiveness to excuse procedural defaults)
- Brown v. Brown, 847 F.3d 502 (7th Cir.) (explains Indiana’s procedural posture makes Martinez/Trevino available to Indiana defendants)
- Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim used as cause must itself be timely raised or is defaulted)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecution’s duty to disclose favorable material evidence to defendant)
- Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (to prevail on claim for destroyed evidence defendant must show bad faith and apparent exculpatory value)