Donald Gould v. Town of Monkton
150 A.3d 1084
Vt.2016Background
- Town of Monkton replaced 1978 zoning regs with a Unified Planning Document (UPD); selectboard revised the UPD after planning commission input and submitted it to a town vote, which approved the UPD in Feb. 2012.
- Landowner claimed the selectboard failed to follow statutory notice and hearing procedures under 24 V.S.A. ch. 117, and that the UPD reduced the development potential of his land (e.g., larger minimum lot size).
- Thirteen months after the vote, landowner filed a declaratory judgment action in the civil division seeking invalidation of the UPD under statutory grounds and later asserted procedural due process claims.
- Town moved to dismiss, arguing the environmental division has exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising under 24 V.S.A. ch. 117; the court also questioned standing because landowner had not applied for a permit at filing.
- Landowner subsequently applied (post- UPD effective date) for subdivision relief under the 1978 regs; the Development Review Board rejected the application and he did not appeal to the environmental division.
- Superior court dismissed: (1) statutory challenge for lack of civil-division jurisdiction (environmental division exclusive); (2) no protected property interest in strict statutory compliance with adoption procedures (legislative act); and (3) no vested property interest in prior 1978 regs because the UPD was in effect when landowner applied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether civil division retained jurisdiction over declaratory/statutory challenge to UPD under 24 V.S.A. ch. 117 | Gould: Civil division retains concurrent jurisdiction; 4 V.S.A. § 34 does not expressly say "exclusive" | Monkton: 2009 statutory reorganization gives exclusive jurisdiction to environmental division for matters under ch. 117 | Civil division lacked jurisdiction; environmental division has exclusive jurisdiction for ch. 117 challenges |
| Whether 24 V.S.A. § 4472(b) permits constitutional challenges to be heard in civil division | Gould: His suit is a constitutional challenge and thus properly in civil division under § 4472(b) | Monkton: Plaintiff’s core claim is statutory (procedural defects); §4472(b) applies only to direct constitutional challenges to bylaw provisions | Court: Plaintiff’s claim is statutory in nature; §4472(b) does not authorize civil-division jurisdiction here |
| Whether landowner has a procedural due process property interest in strict compliance with statutory adoption procedures | Gould: He has a constitutionally protected interest in town’s strict compliance with statutory adoption rules | Monkton: Adoption of zoning is legislative; process errors are statutory/political remedies, not due-process violations | Court: Adoption was legislative; no constitutionally protected property interest in strict statutory compliance; due process claim fails |
| Whether landowner had a vested property interest in continuation of 1978 regulations | Gould: He relied and took substantial steps and applied for permits under 1978 regs, so vested rights exist | Monkton: UPD was in effect when plaintiff applied; Vermont law vests rights only in regulations in effect when a complete application is filed | Court: A permit application cannot retroactively vest rights in prior regulations; UPD governed at time of application; no vested property interest |
Key Cases Cited
- Harvey v. Town of Waitsfield, 401 A.2d 900 (Vt. 1979) (procedural-adoption challenges fall under statutory §4472(a) procedures)
- Smith v. Winhall Planning Comm’n, 436 A.2d 760 (Vt. 1981) (filing a permit application vests rights in regulations existing at time of filing)
- Appeal of Stratton Corp., 600 A.2d 297 (Vt. 1991) (distinguishing legislative rulemaking from adjudication for due process purposes)
- LaFlamme v. Essex Junction Sch. Dist., 750 A.2d 993 (Vt. 2000) (procedural due process requires deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest)
- Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (U.S. 1972) (property interests defined by state law, not Constitution)
- Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (U.S. 1915) (rulemaking affecting many people is a legislative act; political process affords protection)
Affirmed.