Donald Earl Young v. State, 375 P.3d 792

On Aug. 1, 2014, Donald Young drove from a yard while intoxicated, struck a parked car while reversing, fled, and was later found by police at ~10:50 p.m.; 911 call was at 10:39 p.m.
Officers observed alcohol odor, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech; Young performed poorly on field sobriety tests and was arrested.
A breath test at the jail at 12:16 a.m. (97 minutes after the 10:39 p.m. 911 call) produced a 0.079% BAC.
The State presented forensic toxicologist Moss Kent, who performed retrograde extrapolation to estimate Young’s BAC at 10:39 p.m. as 0.095%–0.124%, assuming post‑absorption and using a range of elimination rates.
Young moved in limine to exclude evidence that did not account for the ~15 minutes between the crash and police contact; the court denied the motion but said objections could be raised at trial; Young did not object when the expert testified.
The jury convicted Young of driving under the influence (impairment theory), but not under the per se 0.08% BAC theory; he appealed arguing the expert’s retrograde extrapolation was improperly admitted.

Issue	Young's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Admissibility of retrograde extrapolation evidence	Extrapolation was unreliable without proof Young didn’t drink during the ~15‑minute gap; foundation inadequate	Expert used accepted methods and a conservative range of elimination rates; no evidence Young drank during gap	Admission not plain error; issue of first impression in WY and no clear rule of law breached
Preservation / Standard of review	Argued trial court abused discretion in admitting evidence	State: Young failed to preserve objection; review should be for plain error	Court applied plain‑error review because pretrial denial was non‑definitive and no contemporaneous objection was made at trial
Prejudice from admission of extrapolation	Admission could have led jury to conclude Young was per se impaired while driving	Other strong non‑BAC evidence (witness observations, driving behavior, FST failures) supported impairment conviction	No reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome absent the extrapolation evidence; no prejudice shown
Whether foundation errors can be raised for first time on appeal	(Implicit) Foundation inadequate and should bar expert opinion	Failure to object deprived State the chance to cure foundation; some jurisdictions decline plain‑error review on foundation claims	Court expressed concern such claims often are waived but declined to decide on waiver; nevertheless found no plain error here

Hicks v. Zondag, 317 P.3d 606 (Wyo. 2014) (objection required at trial to preserve issues raised in limine unless ruling was definitive)
Guy v. State, 184 P.3d 687 (Wyo. 2008) (plain‑error standard elements)
United States v. Turrietta, 696 F.3d 972 (10th Cir. 2012) (plain‑error requires an error that was clear and obvious)
People v. Floyd, 11 N.E.3d 335 (Ill. App. 2014) (retrograde extrapolation may be unreliable where key facts, like cessation of drinking, are unknown)
Commonwealth v. Senior, 744 N.E.2d 614 (Mass. 2001) (definition and explanation of retrograde extrapolation)
State v. Honsinger, 386 S.W.3d 827 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (refusal to apply plain‑error review to foundation objections raised for first time on appeal)