Don Titel and Carol Titel v. Morris G. Melchor and Lisa Melchor
03-14-00463-CV
| Tex. App. | Apr 28, 2015Background
- Don & Carol Titel (Appellants) sued Morris & Lisa Melchor (Appellees) after a wildfire originating from the Melchor property damaged neighbors’ property.
- The Melchors retained legal title and insurance on the Pickett Lane property but allegedly gave their son Jeremy control/licensed occupancy of the premises; Jeremy and others allegedly acted as the Melchors’ agents.
- The fire occurred during a burn ban and was allegedly caused by unsupervised persons (including children) on the Melchor property; neighbors had complained about trespassing and unsafe conduct prior to the fire.
- Appellants allege the Melchors were negligent in allowing dangerous, unsupervised activities and are vicariously liable for agents’ conduct; they seek recognition of a duty by landowners to prevent foreseeable wildfires that cross property lines.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the Melchors; Appellants appeal, arguing (1) a duty exists to neighbors under the burn-ban and general negligence principles and (2) factual disputes about agency preclude summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether landowners owe a duty to neighboring property owners to avoid foreseeable wildfire risk | Titel: Yes — burn ban, foreseeable risk, minimal burden to prevent fires; duty extends to neighbors and to control invitees/agents | Melchor: No duty (as argued in appellees’ brief) — summary judgment supported | Trial court granted summary judgment for Melchors (no duty/facts resolved for defendants) |
| Whether Melchors are vicariously liable for acts of persons controlling the property (agency) | Titel: Evidence shows Melchors retained control rights and delegated management to son and others, creating agency and vicarious liability | Melchor: Denies agent/principal relationship sufficient for liability | Appellants argue factual disputes on agency preclude summary judgment; trial court nevertheless disposed of claims in favor of Melchors |
| Whether plaintiffs may characterize the claim as negligent entrustment or general negligence | Titel: Will accept negligent entrustment label if court prefers; primary pleading is general negligence and vicarious liability | Melchor: Implicitly contends plaintiffs did not state proper cause of action or duty | Appellants request court to recognize duty/theory; lower court did not adopt it on summary judgment |
| Whether summary judgment was improper given disputed facts about supervision, trespass, and neighborhood complaints | Titel: There is more than a scintilla of evidence raising fact issues that should preclude summary judgment | Melchor: Argues summary judgment appropriate (as below) | Appellants request reversal and remand for trial; summary judgment currently stands against them |
Key Cases Cited
- Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Fletcher, 975 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. 1998) (framework for recognizing duty by balancing foreseeability, risk, and policy factors)
- Trammell Crow v. Gutierrez, 267 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. 2008) (discusses duty owed to invitees and premises liability principles)
- QuikTrip Corp. v. Goodwin, 449 S.W.3d 665 (Tex. App.–Ft. Worth 2014) (addresses duty questions and standards for duty as a question of law)