Dominguez, Daniel Vasquez
PD-0346-15
| Tex. | Jun 4, 2015Background
- Petitioner Daniel Vasquez Dominguez seeks discretionary review of a Taylor County judgment denying postconviction DNA testing under Article 64.01–64.05, Tex. Code Crim. Proc.; the Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed.
- Appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child in 2000–2001; adjudication followed, with a 30-year sentence entered in 2006.
- Appellant moved for postconviction forensic/DNA testing in 2012; appointed counsel sought testing, but counsel withdrew and the trial court denied testing.
- The appellate court held Chapter 64 governs testing of evidence related to the challenged conviction and found no historical DNA evidence existed to test; claims seeking evidence from a related family-court proceeding were outside Chapter 64’s scope.
- The petition for discretionary review seeks to reverse the appellate decision, argue ineffective assistance and Brady violations, and obtain broader access to exculpatory evidence.
- The appendix includes exhibits concerning the counsel withdrawal, exculpatory evidence filed in a family court, and a 2012 defense-initiated motion to obtain DNA testing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Eleventh District applied the correct factual-sufficiency standard | Dominguez contends the court misapplied the standard in reviewing DNA-testing claims. | State argues the court properly reviewed the denials under Chapter 64 and applicable standards. | No reversible error in standard application; review affirmed |
| Whether appointed counsel violated the defendant's rights by failing to investigate exculpatory evidence | Dominguez contends counsel did not thoroughly investigate exculpatory evidence (pregnancy-related materials) in the 326th District Court file. | State argues the evidence sought was outside Chapter 64’s scope and counsel’s conduct did not prejudice the defense. | Appellate denial affirmed; counsel's performance found not to warrant relief under Chapter 64 |
| Whether Brady/exculpatory evidence suppression violated due process | Dominguez asserts that exculpatory evidence regarding the victim's pregnancy was suppressed. | State maintains evidence sought from a different proceeding is outside Chapter 64 and not subject to Brady in this context. | Brady claim rejected on procedural scope grounds; no relief |
| Whether the trial court erred in denying DNA testing and in not appointing new counsel | Dominguez argues the court failed to provide adequate counsel and denied testing despite probable grounds. | State contends there were no reasonable grounds for testing and no error in appointing new counsel where appropriate. | Affirmed; testing denied; no duty to appoint new counsel |
| Whether Chapter 64 allows review of underlying conviction or only DNA-testing proceedings | Dominguez asserts broader review of the underlying conviction is permissible under Chapter 64. | State instructs Chapter 64 addresses DNA testing only and does not permit collateral attacks on the conviction. | Chapter 64 does not permit collateral challenges to the underlying conviction |
Key Cases Cited
- Murphy v. State, 115 S.W.3d 946 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005) (right to appeal postconviction DNA testing with appointed counsel)
- Gray v. State, 64 S.W.3d 935 (Tex. App.—Maco 2002) (appointed counsel on appeal; DNA testing procedures)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (ineffective assistance standard; prejudice and deficient performance)
- Doxley v. State, 475 U.S. 671 (1985) (exculpatory evidence framework and materiality standards)
- Thacker v. State, 177 S.W.3d 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (procedural vehicle for Chapter 64 testing; scope limits)