Domanic v. Christian Brothers Automotive Corporation, 4:22-cv-00386

Domanic, Jewish by race and religion, applied in Oct. 2020 to open a Christian Brothers Auto franchise in Dripping Springs, TX.
Christian Brothers Auto conducts an eight-step, three-phase interview process for franchise applicants.
Company policy openly states franchises are granted only to Christians; has never awarded to a non-Christian.
Domanic progressed to Step 3 by Nov. 4, 2020, and was informed the process would end on Nov. 17, 2020.
Domanic alleges termination was due to Jewish heritage; Christian Brothers Auto contends religion, not ethnicity, was the basis.
Plaintiff sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 alleging racial discrimination in contract formation; court grants summary judgment for defendant.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Domanic is a protected racial minority under §1981	Domanic is racially Jewish.	Discrimination alleged is based on religion; §1981 protects race/ethnicity, not religion.	Domanic is a protected racial/ethnic minority under §1981.
Whether Christian Brothers Auto intentionally discriminated based on race	Discrimination occurred because of his Jewish identity.	Ending negotiations was due to religion as faith policy; not race.	Court finds no triable issue that race was the motivating factor; proceeds under McDonnell Douglas framework.
Whether Domanic had a concrete contract interest sufficient for §1981	Active, multi-step process and top-candidate status imply a concrete contract interest.	Interest was speculative and not enough for §1981 claim.	Court holds contract interest was concrete enough to support a §1981 claim.
Whether the defendant's proffered non-discriminatory reason is legitimate under §1981	Religious discrimination serves as a pretext for racial bias.	Policy of rewarding Christians is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.	Court accepts the policy as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.
Whether the plaintiff can show pretext to defeat summary judgment	Religious discrimination is a proxy for race; pretext shown by timing and statements.	No evidence that religion was a cover for ethnic exclusion; statements insufficient alone.	No genuine issue of pretext; defendant is entitled to summary judgment.

Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (prohibits racial discrimination in making private contracts)
Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) (racial discrimination includes ethnicity; Jews protected under §1981)
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (distinguishes between religion and ethnicity in §1981 context)
Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 798 F.2d 748 (1986) (§1981 covers race or alienage discrimination in contracting)
Morris v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743 (2001) (loss of actual contract interest required for §1981 claim)
Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020) (McDonnell Douglas framework and pretext analysis under §1981)
Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381 (2017) (describes minimal prima facie burden and pretext framework)
Hager v. Brinker Tex., Inc., 102 F.4th 692 (2024) (applies McDonnell Douglas framework in §1981 context)
Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) (reiterates §1981 protects ethnicity as race)