Dollie Ayers-Jennings v. Fred's, Inc., 461 F. App'x 472

Dollie Ayers-Jennings, an African-American employee at Fred’s, resigned after marriage to Willie Jennings due to a non-fraternization policy that could affect supervision.
Ayers-Jennings alleged race discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, § 1981, and Tennessee HR Act after being forced to resign for marital relationship with a manager.
Fred’s argued the three white employee-couples cited by Ayers-Jennings were not similarly situated in all relevant respects; district court granted summary judgment for Fred’s.
Non-fraternization policy prohibited dating between employees where one could supervise the other; policy included exceptions by the President and related relatives provisions.
Ayers-Jennings had signed a policy acknowledgment in 2005, noting dating a supervisor could lead to disciplinary action, and Fred’s could not find a suitable transfer to avoid supervision.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment ruling, holding Ayers-Jennings failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Prima facie race discrimination established?	Ayers argued comparators were similarly situated and treated more favorably.	Fred’s contends comparators differ in key aspects; no inference of discrimination.	No genuine issue; prima facie failure due to dissimilar comparators.
Were the Easterlings, Hickmans, and Jacobs proper comparators?	These couples were similarly situated and treated more favorably.	Differences in supervision, divisions, and timing rendered them dissimilar.	Not similarly situated; no inference of discrimination.
Did Fred’s offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for resignation?	Policy enforcement was a pretext for discrimination.	Policy enforcement was consistent and non-discriminatory.	Fred’s reason was legitimate and non-pretextual.
Did Ayers-Jennings show pretext by comparing to white comparators?	White comparators’ different circumstances show pretext.	Differences in situations negate a pretext inference.	No showing of pretext; no evidence of discriminatory motive.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (establishes the burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008) (summary judgment standard and burden on plaintiff in discrimination cases)
Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1992) (defined “similarly situated” in guidance for prima facie case)
Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 1998) (factors for determining similarity of employment status)
Ladd v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., Inc., 552 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 2009) (emphasizes evaluating motivation/intent from employer, not business judgment)
Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493 (6th Cir. 1987) (discrimination inquiry focuses on employer’s motive)
Galbraith v. N. Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1991) (non-fraternization context and workplace policy application)
Kline v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 1997) (court scrutinizes policy-driven disciplinary actions)