Doktor v. Doktor
470 Mass. 547
| Mass. | 2015Background
- Joseph and Dorothy Doktor divorced in 1992 after a >20‑year marriage; the divorce judgment incorporated a separation agreement requiring Joseph to pay Dorothy $200/week alimony until her death or remarriage.
- Joseph retired in 2001; in June 2013 he filed to modify/terminate alimony, relying on the 2011 Alimony Reform Act provision (G. L. c. 208, § 49(f)) that general‑term alimony terminates when the payor attains full retirement age.
- The Probate and Family Court dismissed the complaint, concluding the retirement provision is prospective and does not apply to judgments entered before March 1, 2012; the judge also found Joseph had not shown a material change of circumstances warranting termination.
- Facts found by the judge: Joseph is able to pay the $200/week (stipulated); Dorothy’s weekly income (Social Security, dividends, small pension share, sporadic driving income) is insufficient to meet her reasonable weekly expenses ($634.49) without alimony unless she invades substantial assets (investment and IRA accounts totaling roughly $690,000).
- The judge declined to require Dorothy to exhaust principal to meet expenses, concluding she still needs alimony and Joseph can pay.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Alimony Reform Act's retirement termination (§ 49(f)) applies retroactively to pre‑2012 judgments | Joseph: § 49(f) terminates general‑term alimony upon payor reaching full retirement age and should apply to his judgment | Dorothy: The uncodified provisions show the Act was meant to apply prospectively to existing judgments except for newly enacted durational limits | The court held § 49(f) is prospective and does not apply to judgments entered before March 1, 2012 |
| Whether uncodified §4(b) makes other statutory changes a material change of circumstance permitting modification | Joseph: The Act's codified provisions generally allow modification | Dorothy: Uncodified §4(b) says codified §§48–55 are not a material change except that durational limits are an exception | The court held the legislature intended only durational‑limit changes to be treated as automatic material changes; other changes are not |
| Whether Joseph demonstrated a material change in circumstances justifying termination of alimony under pre‑existing modification standards | Joseph: He retired and reached full retirement age; alternatively, Dorothy no longer needs alimony | Dorothy: She still lacks sufficient income to meet reasonable expenses without alimony; principal need not be depleted | The court held Joseph failed to prove a material change; judge did not abuse discretion in denying modification |
| Whether the wife must be required to invade principal assets to eliminate need for alimony | Joseph: Dorothy has substantial assets and could use principal to meet expenses | Dorothy: Requiring depletion of principal is not required; court may protect capital to preserve station of life | The court affirmed that the judge properly declined to force depletion of Dorothy’s principal to meet expenses |
Key Cases Cited
- Murphy v. Department of Correction, 429 Mass. 736 (1999) (construction of uncodified statutory language with codified provisions)
- Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286 (2009) (standard for modification of alimony judgments and consideration of parties' station in life)
- Schuler v. Schuler, 382 Mass. 366 (1981) (judge must weigh all relevant circumstances in modification requests)
- Downey v. Downey, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 812 (2002) (court may decline to require spouse to deplete assets to meet support needs)
- Grubert v. Grubert, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 811 (1985) (measure of post‑marriage need by prior marital standard)