Dokey, Britney Nicole
PD-1285-15
| Tex. App. | Sep 30, 2015Background
- Britney Nicole Dokey pleaded guilty to tampering with a government record; the trial court sentenced her to 20 months in a state jail sentence, probated for four years.
- The State filed a motion to revoke community supervision; Dokey pleaded true to 17 alleged violations.
- The trial court revoked supervision and sentenced Dokey to 17 months confinement and a $100 fine.
- Dokey appealed, arguing due process requires proof of probation violations beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a preponderance of the evidence.
- The Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Texas precedent that revocation need only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard of proof required in probation/community-supervision revocation proceedings | Dokey: Due process and Winship require proof beyond a reasonable doubt before incarceration on revocation | State: Historically, revocation proceedings require only proof by a preponderance; Dokey waived some arguments by not raising them below | Court of Appeals: Affirmed that the State need only prove violation by a preponderance of the evidence and declined to apply the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1967) (juvenile due-process protections)
- In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (U.S. 1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt required for criminal convictions)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1972) (due-process protections for parole revocations)
- Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (U.S. 1973) (procedural protections for probation revocations)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standard for assessing sufficiency of evidence under due process)
- Kelly v. State, 483 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (holding preponderance standard acceptable for probation revocation)
- Collier v. Poe, 732 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (discussing due-process rights belonging to the individual)
- Campbell v. State, 456 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (recognizing revocation hearings as critical stages implicating due process)
- Ex parte Carmona, 185 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (due-process hearing requirements for revocation)
- Ex parte Doan, 369 S.W.3d 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (characterizing revocation proceedings as judicial, not administrative)