Doheny v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing
171 A.3d 930
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | 2017Background
- In 2013 Doheny was convicted of DUI and aggravated-assault-DUI and PennDOT issued two separate one-year suspension notices (one effective 8/7/13, the other 8/7/14). Each notice allowed a 30-day appeal; Doheny did not timely appeal, believing one notice was redundant.
- PennDOT informed Doheny his privileges would be restored 8/7/15 because the suspensions would run consecutively. Doheny obtained nunc pro tunc relief in common pleas to appeal the suspensions.
- Commonwealth Court later held the common pleas court erred in granting nunc pro tunc relief and vacated that order; Doheny’s petition for allowance to the Supreme Court was denied.
- Doheny then filed a multi-count civil action (including Count I seeking injunctive and equitable relief to nullify the DUI suspension and prohibit consecutive suspensions), which was removed to federal court; the federal court dismissed most claims but remanded Count I to state court.
- PennDOT filed preliminary objections in Commonwealth Court arguing Count I is barred by res judicata/administrative finality because Doheny failed to timely appeal the suspension notices. The Commonwealth Court granted PennDOT’s objections and dismissed Count I.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Doheny may collaterally attack PennDOT’s suspension notices in Commonwealth Court after failing to timely appeal | Doheny contended he never had a final merits adjudication because the common pleas’ nunc pro tunc order was vacated; therefore res judicata/administrative finality does not bar his state-law challenge | PennDOT argued administrative finality and res judicata bar any collateral attack where a party failed to timely appeal a final agency suspension decision | Court held administrative finality/res judicata preclude Doheny’s challenge because failing to timely appeal a final administrative suspension forecloses collateral attacks |
| Whether multiple statutory suspensions merge or must run consecutively | Doheny argued Zimmerman remained controlling such that suspensions should merge into one year | PennDOT relied on Bell, which held suspensions for listed violations do not merge and may be consecutive | Court accepted that Bell governs the merger issue and that the underlying suspension determination was effectively final when not appealed |
| Whether the Commonwealth Court has original jurisdiction over the action | Doheny initially litigated in common pleas and federal court; jurisdictional objections were raised | PennDOT argued Commonwealth Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over suits against the Commonwealth/its agencies | Parties stipulated common pleas lacked jurisdiction and the matter was transferred; Commonwealth Court exercised jurisdiction to decide preliminary objections |
| Whether sovereign immunity barred the action (alternative objection) | Doheny sought equitable relief against PennDOT | PennDOT asserted sovereign immunity would bar the requested relief | Court did not reach sovereign immunity because res judicata/administrative finality disposed of the case |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 96 A.3d 1005 (Pa. 2014) (multiple statutory suspensions for listed offenses do not merge and may run consecutively)
- Zimmerman v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 759 A.2d 953 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (earlier authority on merger of suspensions, overruled by Bell)
- Department of Environmental Resources v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 348 A.2d 765 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1975) (articulating administrative finality and limits on collateral attacks to unappealed administrative orders)
- Department of Environmental Protection v. Peters Township Sanitary Authority, 767 A.2d 601 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (reaffirming that failure to appeal a final administrative decision bars later collateral challenges)
- Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 669 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1995) (statement of Pennsylvania res judicata/claim preclusion principles)