Dogoda v. Dogoda
2D16-4447
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Dec 6, 2017Background
- Parties executed a marital settlement agreement (MSA) on September 19, 2014 providing durational alimony of $1,250/month and stating the MSA was effective upon execution.
- The trial court did not enter the final judgment of dissolution until December 30, 2014; Dogoda paid alimony per the MSA while awaiting entry.
- After executing the MSA but before final-judgment entry, Dogoda applied for and obtained approval to retire effective January 23, 2015.
- Three months after retirement, Dogoda petitioned to reduce alimony based on his reduced retirement income and financial hardship.
- The trial court denied the modification, reasoning Dogoda’s retirement was contemplated before the final judgment was entered and treating the final-judgment date as the operative date for Pimm’s “contemplation” prong.
- The appellate court reversed, holding the relevant date for determining whether a change was contemplated is the MSA’s effective date (execution), not the later date of the court’s ratification.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether retirement after MSA execution but before entry of final judgment can support alimony modification under Pimm | Dogoda: His retirement occurred after the MSA was executed, so it was not contemplated and may be a substantial change justifying modification | Ms. Dogoda: Retirement was approved before final judgment, so it was contemplated at the time of final judgment and cannot support modification | Court: Use the MSA execution (effective) date to assess contemplation; retirement was not contemplated at execution and may support modification |
| Proper operative date for determining whether a change was contemplated | Dogoda: The operative date is when the parties executed the MSA (effective date) | Ms. Dogoda: Operative date is entry of the final judgment of dissolution | Court: The effective date of the MSA (execution) controls, not the final-judgment entry date |
| Whether Pimm’s “contemplation” prong creates a bright-line rule pegged to final-judgment date | Dogoda: Pimm should be applied to what parties contemplated when they agreed to terms (MSA date) | Ms. Dogoda: Pimm requires assessing contemplation as of the final judgment | Court: Rejects a bright-line final-judgment rule; equitable inquiry focuses on parties’ contemplation at the time the agreement became effective |
| Whether retirement was reasonable and thus could constitute a substantial change | Dogoda: Retirement was reasonable and involuntary in effect given performance/pension circumstances | Ms. Dogoda: Argued retirement was voluntary and thus not a basis for modification | Court: Trial court found retirement reasonable; appeal does not challenge reasonableness, so retirement may support substantial change under Pimm |
Key Cases Cited
- Pimm v. Pimm, 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992) (retirement, if reasonable, can be a substantial change; sets three-prong test)
- Jarrard v. Jarrard, 157 So. 3d 332 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (states the three-part modification standard)
- Eisemann v. Eisemann, 5 So. 3d 760 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (modification test articulation)
- Jaffee v. Jaffee, 394 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (if parties contemplated an event when fixing award, later occurrence should not permit modification)
- Villanueva v. State, 200 So. 3d 47 (Fla. 2016) (statutory omissions are treated as intentional)