Doggett v. Robinson
345 S.W.3d 94
Tex. App.2011Background
- John Doggett's 1983 will creates Marital and Family Trusts with John M. Robinson as trustee and imposes specific limits on Sylvia's power of appointment.
- Sylvia Doggett's 2002 will purportedly exercises a testamentary power of appointment over those trusts via sections 2.1 and 2.4.
- The trusts were allegedly not funded during Sylvia's lifetime or after her death; John M. Robinson died in 2002.
- John's children (Robert, Florence, Paul) and grandchildren (Paul Jr., Mark, Matthew) sue Beverly Longuet, as executor of Sylvia's estate, and Mary Robinson, as executor of John M. Robinson's estate, challenging the appointment.
- The trial court granted partial summary judgment for Robinson, concluding Sylvia validly appointed Beverly; later a bench trial awarded Robinson attorney's fees; the Doggett claimants appeal.
- The court of appeals reverses, holding Sylvia did not validly exercise the appointment power, and remands for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Sylvia validly exercise the appointment power? | Doggett: not valid; lack of proper specific reference. | Robinson: sections 2.1 and 2.4 together suffice as specific reference. | No; summary judgment reversed; cannot show a valid exercise of the power. |
| Is Beverly Longuet among John's defined descendants under section 9.3? | Doggett contends Beverly is not a descendant as defined. | Robinson argues Beverly falls within the grant via Sylvia's exercise. | Not dispositive here; court focuses on validity of exercise, but issues remain unresolved. |
| Was the award of attorney's fees proper given the partial summary judgment reversal? | Doggett challenge as dependent on the erroneous grant of summary judgment. | Robinson asserts fees follow the prior ruling. | Reversed; attorney's fees award is undone along with final judgment. |
| Should costs and post-judgment interest be awarded on the final judgment? | Not applicable or previously settled by the partial ruling. | Robinson seeks costs and post-judgment interest. | Not reached due to remand and partial reversal; issues preserved for reconsideration. |
Key Cases Cited
- Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas v. Fredericks, 283 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. 1955) (defines the power of appointment by reference to the instrument confirming an exercised power)
- Krausse v. Barton, 430 S.W.2d 44 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1968) (distinguishes power of appointment as not property or an estate)
- Wright v. Greenberg, 2 S.W.3d 666 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999) (two-step process for appointment powers via residuary clauses)
- Hill v. Conrad, 43 S.W.789 (Tex. 1897) (examines when intent to execute a power is sufficiently clear)
- Shriner's Hosp. for Crippled Children of Tex. v. Stahl, 610 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. 1980) (courts may not redraft a will to reflect presumed intention)
- Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1983) (guides construction when language is clear or ambiguous)