Does v. Snyder
101 F. Supp. 3d 672
| E.D. Mich. | 2015Background
- Six Michigan residents (John Does #1-5 and Mary Doe) allege Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA) as amended in 2011 and 2013 violates their constitutional rights; they seek declaratory judgment and injunction, and Defendants move for judgment on the record under Rule 52; the court grants in part and denies in part after a stipulated record and waiver of a full trial.
- Plaintiffs are Tier III offenders required to register for life, with various individual histories described to illustrate the reach and impact of SORA’s provisions; amendments in 2011 aligned SORA with SORNA and added a $50 annual registration fee in 2013.
- The court previously dismissed some counts and allowed Counts IV, V, VII to proceed; Counts VI (retroactive lifetime registration) and IX (Ex Post Facto challenge to the $50 fee) were central to the current ruling.
- Key contested provisions include geographic exclusion zones around schools, loitering and residence bans, reporting obligations (including in-person reporting and Internet-related reporting), and the 2011/2013 amendments’ retroactive effects.
- The court conducts a Rule 52 bench review on the stipulated record, applying vagueness, retroactivity, and First Amendment standards, and enjoins or preserves certain provisions accordingly.
- The court reserves judgment on certain constitutional questions as to homeless registrants and the retroactive incorporation of Internet reporting, requesting further briefing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are SORA’s school geographic exclusion zones void for vagueness? | Plaintiffs argue 1,000-foot zones are inadequately defined and unmeasurable, causing over-policing. | Defendants contend zones have a concrete purpose and are ascertainable. | Unclear measurement basis renders zones vague; enjoined as applied to Plaintiffs. |
| Is the loitering ban within school zones vague as applied to Plaintiffs? | Loitering is ambiguous and curtails protected activity. | Loitering is a clear concept with respect to protecting minors. | Loitering definition is vague as applied; but as to whether it infringes parental rights, further proof needed. |
| Are the Internet-related reporting requirements (email/IM, aliases) unconstitutionally vague or overbroad? | Terms like routinely used, regularly operated, and designation used in internet postings are vague; reporting chills speech. | Definitions and reporting are sufficiently clear; narrowly tailored to protect minors. | Vagueness and overbreadth exist; some Internet reporting provisions declared unconstitutional or enjoined; narrow handling reserved. |
| Is retroactive lifetime registration constitutional, and does it justify incorporation of Internet reporting? | Retroactivity punishes past conduct and burdens fundamental rights; seek heightened scrutiny. | Retroactivity justified by rational purposes: public safety, federal conformity, and national uniformity. | Retroactive lifetime registration constitutional under rational basis; Internet reporting incorporation analyzed under intermediate scrutiny with reservations. |
| Does the $50 annual registration fee violate Ex Post Facto or Tax Injunction Act constraints? | Fee acts as a punitive tax and burdens registrants. | Fee is a general revenue-raising measure subject to tax-like treatment. | Tax Injunction Act governs; court lacks jurisdiction to rule on Ex Post Facto claim; fee treated as tax for §1341 purposes. |
Key Cases Cited
- Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1972) (void-for-vagueness doctrine; notice and enforcement standards)
- Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101 (6th Cir. 1995) (two-part vagueness test; fair notice and standards for enforcement)
- Belle Maer Harbor v. Charter Twp. of Harrison, 170 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999) (vagueness scrutiny heightened for criminal sanctions; standard of reasonableness)
- City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (U.S. 1999) (loitering ambiguity; fair notice in vagueness context)
- Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (U.S. 1989) (time, place, manner restrictions; narrowly tailored)