Does v. Cooper, 148 F. Supp. 3d 477

Plaintiffs John Does 1–5 challenge N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.18(a) as unconstitutional under due process and First Amendment grounds.
Statute prohibits restricted sex offenders from (1) being on premises primarily for minor use, (2) within 300 feet of such locations on mixed-use premises, or (3) at places where minors gather for regularly scheduled programs.
Plaintiffs allege confusion and inconsistent interpretations by district attorneys and law enforcement about where the restrictions apply.
Procedurally, plaintiffs and defendants moved for summary judgment; the court previously denied and granted some relief, and now issues concern vagueness, overbreadth, and severability.
The court holds (a)(1) and (a)(2) are not unconstitutionally vague, (a)(3) is unconstitutionally vague and enjoined, and overbreadth of (a)(2) is contested and to be tried; severability is addressed.
The court severs the unconstitutional portion (a)(3) from § 14-208.18(a) but leaves (a)(1) and (a)(2) in effect pending trial on narrowing and potential severability of (a)(2).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are (a)(1) and (a)(2) vague?	Plaintiffs contend subs. (a)(1)-(a)(2) are vague.	Defendants assert subs. (a)(1)-(a)(2) provide sufficient notice.	Not vague
Is (a)(3) vague and unconstitutional?	Plaintiffs argue (a)(3) is vague and overbroad.	Defendants argue (a)(3) is permissible with proper interpretation.	Unconstitutionally vague; enjoined
Is (a)(2) overbroad in its scope?	Plaintiffs contend (a)(2) sweeps too broadly, chilling speech.	Defendants claim (a)(2) is narrowly tailored to protect minors.	Disputed on record; summary judgment denied; trial ordered on narrowing and overbreadth as applied to non-minor offenses
Severability of the statute’s subsections?	Plaintiffs argue severability could save constitutionally deficient parts.	Defendants argue severability preserves valid portions.	Unconstitutional (a)(3) severed; (a)(1)-(a)(2) left intact; possible severance of (a)(2) if overbreadth found

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (U.S. 2015) (vagueness requires fair notice and clear standards)
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (U.S. 1983) (requires ascertainable standards to avoid arbitrary enforcement)
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1972) (statutes must balance precision with reasonable certainty)
United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001) (casual contact exceptions for associational restrictions)
State v. Armstrong, 775 S.E.2d 926 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (objective standard used for ‘primarily intended’ analysis)
State v. Simpson, 763 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (noting difficulty in proving places are primarily for minors in (a)(2))
United States v. Nieves-Castado, 480 F.3d 597 (1st Cir. 2007) (measure distance from a location when evaluating vagueness)
Packingham, 777 S.E.2d 738 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (implicates tailoring of internet restrictions for offenders)