815 F. Supp. 2d 208
D.D.C.2011Background
- Three mentally disabled MRDDA residents sue DC under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging DC consented to non-emergency procedures without proper authority.
- Jane Doe I, pregnant in 1984, had an abortion with DC consent allegedly without consulting her legal representative or obtaining court authorization.
- Jane Doe II, diagnosed in 1994, underwent elective eye surgery after DC consent, without consulting her court-appointed guardian mother.
- Jane Doe III, pregnant in 1978, had an abortion with DC consent without consulting her legal representative and without a court order.
- DC law: Health-Care Decisions Act requires court authorization for abortion/sterilization/psycho-surgery for incapacitated persons; MRDDA Act forbids sterilization absent proper process; MRDDA duties to habilitation and dignity.
- Prior rulings (2005-2011): court enjoined unlawful consent policy, then Court of Appeals held DC policy complied with law and due process; subsequent proceedings on merits and authority to consent continued.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether leave to amend is timely | Delay not undue given proceedings history | Delay undue and prejudicial since discovery closed | Leave granted |
| Whether amendment would be unduly prejudicial | No substantial prejudice; same core facts, limited new theories | New theories broaden case and defenses; prejudice possible | Not unduly prejudicial |
| Whether proposed amendment is futile | Counts state new theories (battery, lack of proper consent, MRDDA rights) | Counts barred by res judicata and existing authorities | Count One may state a new theory; Counts Two–Eight granted for amendment; not futile |
| Whether abortions require court order to consent for incompetents | Constitutional due process may require court oversight for abortions of incompetents | Court already authorized by policy; prior precedents control | Count One viable; retains question for briefing |
| Whether MRDDA-related claims can proceed under state statute | Statutory rights under MRDDA allow private action and protection of dignity | Statutory limitations and lack of direct right to sue may bar claims | Counts Three–Five may proceed; Counts Six–Eight also allowed |
Key Cases Cited
- Alley v. Resolution Trust Corp., 984 F.2d 1201 (D.C.Cir.1993) (delay alone not a sufficient ground to deny leave to amend)
- Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080 (D.C.Cir.1998) (preference for hearing cases on their merits over technical rules)
- Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418 (D.C.Cir.1996) (undue prejudice analysis includes path of discovery and strategy shift)
- Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545 (D.C.Cir.1999) (standard for evaluating amendment delay and prejudice)
- Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (U.S. Supreme Court 1999) (permissible to amend to state alternative theories under Rule 8)
- Doe ex rel. Tarlow v. District of Columbia, 489 F.3d 376 (D.C.Cir.2007) (DC code provisions restricting abortions absent court order)
- Does I through III v. District of Columbia, 593 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C.2009) (court held MRDDA authority to consent to surgeries; issues remained on liberty interests)